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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

In recent times, highly notable cyber-attacks have targeted critical infrastructure with the
goal of affecting physical processes to cause harm. These processes are under the control
of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and are managed and monitored by an overall
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. Specific examples of these
attacks include Stuxnet [44], the attack on the water treatment plant in Maroochy [18], the
attack on the Ukrainian power system [50], and an early attack involving an explosion in
the Trans-Siberian Pipeline [48, 49]. These attacks have caused destruction, inefficiencies,
and sabotage of cyber-physical systems - a generic term encompassing SCADA systems
and emphasizing computer (cyber) systems that impact the physical world [39]. Such
cyber-attacks have come to the attention of governments and research organizations, who
seek to better understand and address these threats to protect SCADA systems, which
manage various types of critical infrastructure essential to society. If these systems fail,
potentially catastrophic consequences can result, leading to economic destruction and
danger to public safety.
SCADA systems consist of a network and devices, such as PLCs, servers, and other
computers that make up the network’s nodes. This architecture makes them similar to
typical general Information Technology (IT) networks. SCADA systems mainly differ in
that they interface with the physical world through actuators and sensors of PLCs and other
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). Research towards mitigations of cyber-attacks has
been quite extensive in the literature for SCADA systems and includes firewalls,
encryption, authentication, and other techniques and technologies [22]. One type of
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mitigation involves Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) to detect malicious behavior on
networks. IDSs can be used in general IT networks. However, the previously mentioned
examples of cyber-attacks were largely able to perform their destructive acts before being
discovered. These cyber-attacks were only discovered after the destruction occurred. There
is a concern in the research community about zero-day attacks, in which exploits and
vulnerabilities are unknown, except by the attacker [49]. The term zero-day attack refers
to the fact that the cybersecurity engineer who works to patch the vulnerability has zero
days to respond to the vulnerability once the attack becomes known. Because defenders
have no knowledge of zero-day attacks, mitigations to defeat these attacks from a
conventional cybersecurity perspective do not exist. Therefore, it is necessary to
understand how to detect and mitigate against zero-day attacks, and especially those in
which the effect to the physical system can be predicted before the attack has taken control
of PLCs or the actuators associated with them. This work seeks to advance research toward
detecting zero-day attacks against SCADA systems by presenting a generic and deployable
control/command analysis intrusion prevention system.
1.1. Motivation
As mentioned, several motivating real-world cyber-attacks serve as examples of interest
for study in this work. These examples deal with cyber-attacks that have affected the
normal operation of critical infrastructure and will be discussed in more depth since these
attacks are relevant to this work.
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1.1.1. Stuxnet Attack
Stuxnet is a computer worm that successfully attacked SCADA systems in 2010 at a
nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran. Stuxnet spread to Windows Personal
Computers (PCs) and was capable of spreading through networks. Stuxnet also was able
to cross air gaps by means of USB drives. Even if computer systems and networks were
isolated from the internet or other major networks, an unwitting user could transfer Stuxnet
from a computer infected by Stuxnet to a physically isolated computer. The user could
simply plug the USB drive into the infected machine and then plug the same drive into
another machine. As the worm spreads through networks, the worm searches for PCs
equipped with Siemens Step 7 software and determines whether the PC is connected to a
PLC. The Stuxnet attack vector escalated privilege on the PC to use the software client
(Step 7) designed to program the PLC. Once the malware infected the PC with a malicious
dynamic link library (DLL), the malware could send and update the PLC's code from the
infected PC so that the PLC caused the centrifuges to spin at speeds outside of a safe
operating range, ultimately resulting in damage to the centrifuges. The malware hid itself
from detection in the PC so that commercial anti-malware at the time was not able to find
the worm [44]. There are a few notable points of observation from this cyber-attack. First,
the infected PC that can communicate with the PLC via a network is a trusted system to
that PLC. Taipale’s work [19] defined trusted systems as “systems in which some
conditional prediction about the behavior of people or objects within the system has been
determined prior to authorizing access to system resources.” Quite often, PLC’s have very
few mechanisms to ensure trust. The PLCs will simply process any attempt to communicate
with them. However, newer PLCs may be equipped with software that requires
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authentication, a conventional security feature for standard general computer systems.
Second, because the PC is a trusted system, the PC can initiate requests to the PLC to
update the PLC's ladder logic, settings, and firmware. Therefore, if a cyber-attack manages
to infect and compromise the PC, which is the trusted system, the cyber-attack can also
take advantage of the PLC. The PLC will act as if the PC is legitimate when the PLC and
PC communicate, even if standard mitigations are employed, such as encryption and
authentication between the two devices.
1.1.2. Maroochy Attack
In 2000, the Maroochy Attack was performed by a disgruntled employee who had access
to the Industrial Control System (ICS) of the Maroochy Wastewater Treatment Plant
(WWTP) in Australia. This attack was performed using the plant’s wireless network and
involved changing the settings of PLCs that interacted directly with the physical process
of a wastewater treatment plant. The settings were changed maliciously so that there was
an undesired impact on the surrounding area and community. Specifically, sewage was
released into the environment.
The Maroochy WWTP consisted of 142 pumping stations and a central computer
to oversee the entire operation. During the attack, the plant personnel noted the following
observed behavior: “Pumps were not running when they should have been. Alarms were
not reporting to the central computer. A loss of communication between the central
computer and various pumping stations occurred.” It was discovered that these strange
behaviors can be accounted for if a threat actor is sending unauthorized commands. The
stations of the WWTP can be at risk of overflowing if the pumps are configured incorrectly
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- a situation that the attack brought about. If the stations of the WWTP are about to
overflow, the PLCs that control them will normally send an alarm to the central computer.
However, pump station settings were changed so that there was no alarm. According to the
work by MITRE [18], the actions that the disgruntled employee took could have been
countered with proper controls by using access controls and proper authentication
according to a publication of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[21]. However, it would be interesting to consider the scenario, where the adversary can
bypass standard controls or mitigations such as the authentication or can provide acceptable
authentication as a result of taking advantage of unknown vulnerabilities with zero-day
attacks. If such were the case, then the threat actor can still perform any desired commands
without hindrance. With an intrusion prevention system that can determine the impact of
adversarial commands, it is possible to detect and limit the amount of destruction.
1.1.3. Ukrainian Attack
In 2015, attackers were able to effectively shut down a power system in Ukraine, resulting
in power outages that affected approximately 225,000 customers. Several substations were
disconnected for three hours. An adversary of foreign origin managed to illegally obtain
access to the SCADA system and to control the system remotely. To achieve the attack,
hackers utilized various methods that included spear phishing, which is a tactic that
involves sending emails with malware to key individuals within an organization to meet
malicious objectives [70]. The emails contained compromised MS office documents and
were sent to employees of the utility. The Microsoft Office documents installed the Black
Energy 3 malware. Black Energy 3 involves a remote desktop backdoor enabling the threat
actors to access the affected computers. The malware was introduced into the power
5

company’s enterprise IT systems and eventually to the computers that manage the SCADA
system. Once the system was infected with malware, the threat actors could remotely
access the computers in the utility’s control room and remotely operate the Graphical User
Interface (GUI) application that plant operators use to control circuit breakers. The control
room computers are trusted nodes from the perspective of the protective relays and other
IED connected to the physical system. The attackers were able to manually open circuit
breakers by issuing commands to the protective relays which shut down parts of the power
system [50].
1.1.4 Incident on Trans-Siberian Pipeline
In 1982, a massive explosion occurred in a major pipeline in Siberia in the former Soviet
Union, which is now part of Russia. Settings in the software for actuators, such as pumps
and valves, for the pipeline were selected or modified such that there was a possible buildup
of very high pressure, causing the incident. Although the cause of this incident was
attributed to operator error, it has also been reported that a logic bomb, a special type of
malicious software triggered by special conditions, was responsible for the event [48], [49].
Logic bombs can be maliciously planted in computer software during development or
manufacturing.

1.2. Characterizing the Threat
What the above examples have in common, regardless of the method used to infiltrate the
main network of the SCADA system or the trusted computer nodes in the network, is that

6

they each involve a malicious command or program that places the physical system in an
undesired state – whether unsafe or inefficient or destructive. Therefore, the threat model
under consideration consists of attacks in which the adversary has a malicious objective to
cause one of these states. Malicious commands can be delivered as network packets that
direct the PLC to change a setting associated with it. A program for a PLC can be
considered a sequence of actions by the program to adjust the actuators affecting the
physical process. These actions are dependent on the program logic. The actions are also
usually dependent on the sensor values, internal software state variables, and timers. The
threat may appear in every way to be normal from the network’s perspective so that the
threat can hide from certain types of IDSs that are focused on the traffic and behavior of
the network. On the other hand, some network behaviors can be analyzed by network IDSs
to aid in distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate network activity. This could
allow for detecting other attacks that do not hide themselves well from a network
perspective.
The IPS presented in this work focuses on commands that may appear legitimate
from the network’s perspective. For example, these commands could impact the physical
world through the actuators of a PLC. However, the effect of these commands may not be
totally harmful or immediately harmful. In that case, there is ambiguity as to whether the
command is ultimately harmful. Detecting strange network behavior or at least strange
network behavior that is correlated with the nearly harmful physical effect could allow for
a judgement to be made by the IPS whether a cyber-attack is attempting to cause harm. A
summary of the primary types of attacks considered in this work are in the following
paragraphs.
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1.2.1. Malicious Commands
Malicious commands are characterized by their tendency to place the physical system into
an undesired state. In the context of SCADA systems, an undesired state would be an
unsafe state or a state that is inefficient or has negative economic consequences [23]. This
dissertation uses predefined unsafe states, which are a part of the specification of the system
as determined by a human with expert domain knowledge of various engineering systems
under consideration. The malicious commands can be further divided into categories and
will be discussed later in this work.
1.2.2. Malicious Uploaded Programs
Other works exist that address evaluating PLC code to determine if there is any potential
execution path in the code that will place the cyber-physical system into an unsafe state
that is defined beforehand [7],[8],[9]. What distinguishes this dissertation from those works
is that the model of the physical system is used to evaluate whether the program’s actions
to control the actuators would place the cyber-physical system into undesired states. Some
of the malicious programs may be designed such that they have an immediate harmful
effect. While others are designed intentionally to appear normal in their behavior initially,
but then have a harmful effect later. These may be termed latent effects. Such effects are
desired from the perspective of the threat actor, who would like to remain hidden so that
the user of the SCADA system will trust the system since it appears to be functioning
normally. Two major types of malicious programs with latent effects are time bombs and
logic bombs. In cybersecurity, time bombs are defined as malicious software whose
malicious behavior is triggered after a given amount of time. A logic bomb is defined as
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malicious software that is triggered for a specific set of conditions. The concept of a ladder
logic bomb can be found in Govil‘s work [20], which considered ladder logic or
programmation for the PLC as distinct from the firmware, which is defined as the operating
system (OS) and other supporting software including drivers.
1.3. Understanding ICS to Mitigate the Threat
To address threats like these examples, governments and research organizations have
worked to develop mitigations. Methods of mitigation include those that are standard to
general IT systems. However, ICSs have several major differences that distinguish them
from general IT systems:
● ICSs have relatively regular patterns of behavior and typically a static set of
nodes, or digital devices, connected to the main network. On the other hand,
general IT systems possess more random behavior as nodes are regularly added or
removed, and programs are run at various random times.
● ICSs interact directly with physical processes in the real world. These physical
processes are relatively deterministic such that given certain inputs and states,
outputs and new states may be determined. Note that natural disturbances and
component failure to the physical system may affect the state and output of the
physical system.
● ICSs traditionally have had less computational processing capability and more
limited memory than the computers used in IT systems.
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● ICSs are usually not patched with software updates as frequently as their
counterparts in general IT systems or at least systems on the enterprise network.
These patches may include security enhancements to the software.
● ICSs tend to have strict real-time requirements. At least, they do more often than
general IT systems. Increased network delay and processing times have greater
consequences for ICS because there are physical implications in the real world
[48].
Therefore, it is necessary to respond to the threats by taking advantage of the unique
aspects of SCADA systems that set them apart from other computer systems. This work
leverages the fact that SCADA systems impact the physical world. This impact is brought
about through commands and programs that direct the behavior of the system’s actuators
controlled by PLCs. If the impact of these commands and programs can be predicted before
being processed, then unsafe and inefficient states of the ICS can be potentially avoided.
1.4. Summary of Approach
The approach of this work is to create an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) that will
monitor commands and, to a limited extent, programs delivered to the PLC in the form of
packets before these packets are processed by the PLCs. As these packets are examined, a
prediction is made on what effect the packet would have on the physical system. The
overall hypothesis of this work is that harmful programs and commands can be detected
before allowing them to be processed. The method of making a prediction is summarized
as follows: A simulation is run in an IPS module inside the PLC. The simulation
incorporates a modified PLC process and a model of the physical process controlled by the
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PLC. The scraped command is pre-executed on the simulated PLC process, and its effects
are applied to the simulated physical system model. If the result of the command preexecution is harmful, the command is blocked and an alert is issued. If the command is not
harmful, it is allowed to execute on the real PLC and affect the real physical process. This
simulation is useful as a means of prediction because it allows for the testing of the PLC
programs and input. This prediction process, which involves running the ladder logic with
the model for a given number of scan cycles, can be considered a form of dynamic analysis.
Dynamic analysis is a technique in malware analysis, where suspicious software is run in
a sandboxed environment to be observed. To create the model of the physical process,
training must be performed where inputs and outputs of the physical system are collected
as time-series data and parameters of models are tuned to cause the model to fit the
observed behavior. Techniques in system identification and machine learning allow for this
training to occur. Subsequent work may build on this dissertation by using more elaborate
malware analysis techniques, including static analysis and instrumentation of ladder logic,
to study the paths of execution taken in the ladder logic during dynamic analysis.
1.5. Contributions
Several contributions were made in this research work. They are as follows:
First, testbeds spanning multiple engineering domains were developed. One is a
generator system, certain aspects of which were used to test the conceptual IPS that is
proposed in this work. Testbeds of modified hydraulic systems were also created. These
testbeds were used for the purposes of experimenting with a variety of physical processes
using the IPS. The hydraulic-based testbeds include a one-station pipeline with a variable-
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speed pump, a water tank made with Simulink’s SimHydraulics toolbox, and an alternate
water tank based on equations used in hydraulics. A testbed of a Heating Ventilation and
Air Conditioning (HVAC) system was also created based on a MATLAB example and
other sources.
Second, this work introduces a novel IPS that makes predictions of potential
impacts of the payloads sent to the PLC. This IPS is called Embedded Process Prediction
Intrusion Prevention System (EPPIPS). The payloads come as packets. EPPIPS performs
deep packet inspection on the packets to observe the specific settings of the commands.
The threat model that consists of these payloads includes malicious commands and
malicious PLC ladder logic programs. EPPIPS makes these predictions with the feedback
loop of a PLC process coupled with the dynamic physical system model. The simulated
PLC process is distinct from the main PLC process in the PLC hardware that actually
controls the real physical process. Although this work does not specifically focus on
malware analysis of cyber-physical systems, it does create a dynamic simulation of cyberphysical systems to determine effects. The IPS is placed in the PLC itself in the firmware
as a proxy process between the actual PLC process and the network. This placement and
implementation are similar to the “on the edge” approach for an IPS [47]. The purpose of
this approach is to serve as the innermost layer of defense in a defense in depth strategy
that protects the PLC from cyber-attacks in a defense. Defenses on the outer layers, on the
other hand, may include mitigations such as encryption and firewalls. The IPS presented
here is a last line of defense against cyber-attacks that would affect a physical process under
the control of the PLC. Since the IPS uses a PLC process to make predictions within the
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PLC hardware itself, the unique approach of this work creates and exploits the idea of a
PLC within a PLC.
Third, a contribution of this work is the ability to make these predictions for
physical processes where specifications of either the safety conditions, models of the
physical process, or both are not explicitly given. In the case that specifications are not
available, they must be determined or approximated from data that is collected during
normal operation of the SCADA system.
Fourth, this work examines methods of responding to attacks to prevent or limit
their potential to cause harm. For example, if EPPIPS can predict that a command or
program is harmful to the physical system by violating a safety condition, then the
command or program can be thwarted by simply not letting the PLC process the
questionable payload. However, preventing processing of the command may not be the
desired response in all cases when harm is predicted. Factors must be considered, such as
when the harm is predicted to occur. Therefore, different responses were experimented
with and studied in this work. For example, if EPPIPS predicts that by processing a certain
command, the PLC will enter into an unsafe state several minutes from the time of
receiving the command, it may be acceptable to process the command. On the other hand,
if EPPIPS predicts that the incoming command would cause an unsafe situation very
quickly such that a plant operator would not be able to respond, then another action should
be taken. This action could simply be to block the command from being processed.
Fifth, an analysis and evaluation of the methods of this work for the conceptual
intrusion prevention system and study of payload impacts are performed across the
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multiple engineering domains to study how applicable and generic the methods are. These
domains are the domains that the testbeds fall under, namely mechanical, hydraulic, and
thermodynamic.
The following table (Table 1.1) provides a summary of the major contributions of
this work.
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Table 1.1: Summary of Contributions

Contribution

Description

1. Testbeds Spanning Multiple
Engineering Domains

Two versions of the storage tanks, a onestation pipeline with a variable speed pump,
an electric generator system, and a heating
and cooling system were developed.

2. Novel IPS Capable of Predicting
Effects of Payloads

An IPS internal to PLC is designed as a proxy
process to evaluate command packets and
ladder logic uploads using a form of dynamic
analysis to predict effects on the physical
process.

3. Ability to Operate with Limited
Specifications

The model process and the safety conditions
may be given as specifications. However, one
or both may not be given.

4. Ability to Respond to Incoming
Malicious attacks

Several methods of responding to attacks are
explored to determine their effectiveness

5. Analysis and Evaluation of Methods

Versatility of IPS was evaluated to determine
how well it could perform with the various
testbeds.
The latency and accuracy of the IPS were
evaluated.
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1.6 Organization of this Work
The remaining chapters of this work are as follows: Chapter 2 is a literature review that
includes major developments of the types of intrusion detection systems relevant to this
work and other related works. Chapter 3 covers the problem statement, including the
SCADA system architecture and threat model. Chapter 4 covers some necessary
background for this work on PLCs and related concepts. Chapter 5 consists of the detailed
design of EPPIPS. Chapters 6 discusses the experimental setup and covers the testbeds,
which are used for experiments of the proposed methodology. Chapter 7 is the evaluation
of this work and contains the results and an analysis. Chapter 8 discusses the conclusions
and future directions. Finally, the appendix includes the malicious ladder logic used in this
work in greater detail than discussed in the testbed and experimental setup chapters.

16

CHAPTER 2.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to understand the current state of the art relevant to this work, it is important
to study the major developments of intrusion detection and prevention in cyber-physical
systems. Therefore, this chapter examines the advantages and disadvantages of the major
categories and subcategories of intrusion detection and protection systems related to this
work and those leading to the specific form of intrusion detection of this work. It is also
necessary to review the literature on how cyber-attacks take advantage of cyber-physical
systems in order to be able to address the threats.
2.1. General Developments Leading to This Work’s Focus
Several surveys discuss intrusion detection and prevention for cyber-physical
systems, industrial control systems, and SCADA systems, which are all related terms.
Intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) are essentially intrusion detection systems (IDSs) with
the additional function of responding to intrusions directly to mitigate or neutralize those
intrusions, whereas IDSs merely alert the SCADA system operator of intrusions. Note that
for the purposes of this chapter unless a distinction needs to be made, the term IDS will be
used generically for convenience since it is understood that IPSs are IDSs with additional
functionality. Therefore, IPSs can be considered a subset of IDSs. Notable IDS surveys
can be found in [13], [14], [25], which organize the IDSs into taxonomies. Several major
types of IDSs are discussed including their advantages and disadvantages. Some types of
IDSs are optimized for detecting certain attacks but not other attacks.
Broadly speaking, there are several major types of intrusion detection systems
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according to the work by Mitchel et al. [14]: (1) Knowledge-based or misuse-based, (2)
Behavioral-based, (3) Behavior-specification-based.
Knowledge-based or misuse-based IDSs involve signatures of known attacks. If the
IDS encounters an intrusion with a signature stored in the IDS’s database, the IDS is very
effective at detecting the attack. However, if the intrusion has never had the signature of
an attack catalogued in the IDS’s database, the attack can go undetected. This is especially
problematic when dealing with zero-day attacks, which are attacks that exploit
vulnerabilities that are yet unknown to the vendors of the hardware or software involved.
Behavioral-based IDSs have a concept of normal behavior, which in some cases
can be determined through machine learning algorithms. This IDS type generally can
handle zero-day attacks where the particular exploit is unknown. As the attack operates in
computer systems and networks, the overall behavior of these systems can change from a
normal baseline and therefore lead to the attack being detected regardless of whether the
exploit and vulnerability remain unknown.
Behavior-specification-based intrusion detection is actually a subcategory of the
second. It consists of well-defined conditions for normal behavior, which make up the
specification. This type of IDS has the advantage of being highly accurate in determining
violations of normal behavior. Another advantage of the behavior-specification-based IDS
and also behavior-based is the ability to handle zero-day attacks. This is because the attack
generally causes an effect on the overall behavior of the cyber physical system (as seen in
the network traffic or the physical system process variables) that causes a deviation from
normal or allowed behavior according to given specifications. This deviation can appear
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as symptomatic of cyber intrusions to the IDS regardless of what vulnerability was taken
advantage of by a given exploit that the attacker uses. However, a disadvantage to this type
of IDS is that the specifications may be very cumbersome to develop. The specifications
are usually created by a human domain expert as opposed to being generated by means of
automation. Figure 2.1 depicts a tree that is formed by organizing these main categories of
IDS.

Figure 2.1 Main Focus of This Work (shown in green) in Mitchel’s Taxonomy
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Figure 2.2: Main Focus of This Work (shown in green) in Hu’s Taxonomy

On the other hand, the work by Hu et al [25], has a different, but at the same time,
useful taxonomy to organize IDSs, especially for IDSs designed for cyber-physical
systems. Figure 2.2 above shows a tree representing Hu’s Taxonomy as found in the
survey. The survey uses the following major categories: (1) Protocol analysis–based IDS,
(2) Traffic mining–based IDS, and (3) Control process analysis–based IDS.
Protocol analysis-based IDS is concerned with the format and structure of the
packets used in the network. Traffic mining-based IDS is concerned with the overall traffic
behavior on the network. These first two major categories are not necessarily specific to
cyber-physical systems since they examine features and phenomena associated with a
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network that are usually common to general IT networks, such as inter-arrival time for
packets and size of packets.
However, the last major category - control process analysis-based IDS - is specific
to cyber-physical systems. This last category places an emphasis on the physical process
under consideration and the semantics of the data and signals that have physical meanings.
The physical meanings include quantities such as temperature, voltage, pressure, etc. The
major category control process analysis-based IDS further divides into subcategories: (i)
control process analysis-based IDS, (ii) control command analysis-based IDS, and (iii) ICS
physical model-based. The first subcategory (i) consists of IDSs that focus on the process
data or sensor data, which come from sensors that read the physical quantities associated
with the physical environment or system. The subcategory (ii) are the IDSs that examine
the control commands introduced into a SCADA system since these tend to impact the
physical world. The focus of this proposed work is on this control command analysis-based
subcategory (ii) of control process analysis–based IDS. In control command analysis-based
IDSs, the IDS examines the commands to determine if the commands cause the SCADA
system to have an undesired effect [25]. The last subcategory (iii) is the ICS physical
model-based IDS. In this type of IDS, a model of the physical system is used to compare
with the sensor data of the cyber-physical system. When the controller that manages the
physical system sends specific signals to the actuators to control the physical system, those
signals are also passed through the model to determine what the sensor data should be.
These calculated sensor values are then compared with what is purported to be the real
sensor data coming from the sensors. If there is a discrepancy between the modeled or
forecasted sensor data and the data that is coming from the sensors, then a determination
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can be made that a cyber-attack could be introducing false sensor data. There are several
major authors and works that use this IDS strategy. A prominent author who deals with
this type of IDS, Cardinas et al. wrote a paper discussing a linear time-invariant (LTI) statespace model, which can be used to generate residuals when the model’s outputs are
compared with the sensor data [60]. The residuals indicate malicious sensor data that could
have arisen from a cyber-attack or a fault in the sensors.
Using the Mitchell taxonomy of IDS for cyber physical systems described
previously, this work may be considered a variant of Specification-based IDS since it
incorporates (1) a model of the physical system and (2) defined safety and efficiency
requirements, which together form the specification. Since predictions with a focus on the
effects of commands are made using a model of the physical system and then evaluated
against the specifications, this work also falls under the control command analysis-based
IDS in Hu’s taxonomy. The Hu taxonomy [25] only describes two examples of the control
command analysis-based type. What follows is a more expanded review and discussion of
the relevant literature for this work.
2.2. Expanded Literature Review for Control Command Analysis-Based IDS
Previous research that is relevant to this work includes works in which a command
packet sent over a network to a PLC is evaluated before it is processed by the PLC. This is
done to prevent the PLC from processing a payload that is harmful to the cyber-physical
system, especially the physical aspect of the system. In other words, before the payload
even affects the physical system, a prediction is made on what the payload will do. The
evaluation is performed by simulating the scenario in which the payload is processed by
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the PLC or Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) to affect the physical system using a model
of the physical system, but without actually executing this on the real PLC or IED. This
simulation is done to predict what would occur had the payload really been processed. This
is in contrast to other works that observe the overall behavior of the cyber-physical system
and attempt to detect abnormal behavior once the cyber-attack has already begun to have
an impact on the physical process. A survey that discusses many papers on that type of
IDS where the attack starts to have an effect can be found in [24]. The survey focuses on
IDSs for detecting cyber-attacks that manage to affect sensor and actuator data and signals
as the attacks are occurring and influencing the physical process. Such research is
important because it takes into account the semantics of the cyber-physical system.
However, the focus of this current work is on detecting attacks, especially commandrelated attacks before they have any impact on the cyber-physical system so that the harm
caused by attacks can be prevented. Therefore, the control command analysis-based IDS
has the advantage of protecting the SCADA system from potential damage to the cyberphysical system. Several recent works incorporate models of power systems, where
incoming commands that are sent to a PLC or RTU (Remote Terminal Unit) are evaluated
with the model in a simulation or simply a calculation to determine what the effect of the
command would be before the command is processed. If the effect is such that a safety
violation occurs, the IDS will be able to alert the operator of the power system and
potentially drop or delay the command. In the case of power systems, safety requirements
would typically specify certain ranges of acceptable voltages for buses (V < V max) and
currents for transmission lines (I < Imax). Values above the maximum voltage or current
would, of course, be considered unsafe.
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The IDS by Chromik [1] focuses on malicious packets that do not appear malicious
from the perspective of the network. In other words, these malicious packets can elude the
IDS techniques that fall under either protocol analysis-based IDS and traffic analysis-based
IDS. In Chromik’s work, a model of the physical system and a set of safety requirements
are used for the specification. Before a command is processed by the SCADA system, it is
tested against the model of the power system to determine if violation occurs for a defined
set of safety requirements for voltage and current before the command is allowed to be
processed. The commands used in Chomik’s paper are commands that change the state of
switches in the power system to allow current to flow in transmission lines when the
switches are closed or to not flow when the switches are open. A real testbed appears not
to be used in the paper. Calculations are performed for various scenarios even though an
actual IDS is not implemented. In Chromik’s second paper on the IDS [2], the same authors
propose a similar IDS building on their previous work. The paper [2] includes transformers
whose tap switch position can be changed through commands that the IDS also evaluates
before allowing the command to take effect. This feature is another type of controllable
device besides the switches. Another feature that makes the newer research in the second
paper different from the previous paper is that it involves creating a local IDS as opposed
to a central IDS since modern smart grids are better suited for distributed control. The word
“local” in this context means that the IDS is in the vicinity of the PLC or closely tied to it.
On the other hand, the term “central” implies that the IDS is implemented in a central part
of the SCADA system overseeing the entire operation, perhaps in the control room with
HMI’s that are accessible to human operators. This distributed control is needed for
stability in the power system and allows for a balanced operation. One advantage of the
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localized approach over the centralized IDS is that the centralized IDS is more vulnerable
to man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks, since a threat actor can intercept communication sent
from the PLC to the centralized IDS to deceive the IDS from being aware of the true
condition of cyber-physical system. Also a Denial of Service (DoS) attack can prevent
situational awareness for the centralized IDS. If the centralized IDS is an IPS and must be
able to act based on whether it has detected an intrusion, it will not be able to respond
during a DoS attack. Another relevant paper [62] by Flosbach and Chromik, the same
author as the previous works, uses a testbed to allow for experimentation of the author’s
previous ideas. In the work, packets are examined and processed at local substations to
determine if they would cause an unsafe condition to the power system. If it is predicted
that the packets would cause an unsafe condition, then the IDS blocks the packets. The
paper does not make a distinction between a malicious entity’s commands that turn out to
be benign and normal use of the SCADA system. All of those commands would be allowed
to affect the SCADA system.
Like the previously mentioned works, Lin et al. in [3] also have a power grid as
their cyber-physical system of choice. But in Lin’s work, implementations of the power
system and the IDS are developed and tested. In their work, a "look ahead" analysis is
performed before execution of the commands affecting the breakers of the power grid. The
commands are legitimate in their structure. That is, the commands, which are network
packets, fit the format of the appropriate SCADA protocol being used. However, the
packet’s contents may be harmful in terms of what actions would be taken on the power
grid. The control of the grid is performed in a centralized computer master. Lin explicitly
refers to the IDS as a specification-based IDS. Matpower, a toolbox provided in MATLAB,
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is used to simulate the power grid. Several methods of power flow analysis are used that
include DC analysis and Newton Raphson for AC analysis. Therefore, this work allows for
a dynamic simulation of the power system as opposed to a simpler steady-state analysis
where transient behaviors of the power systems are neglected, which is in contrast to
Chromik’s work. Both network-based IDS and centralized IDS are used in Lin’s work. The
subsequent work by Lin [4] focuses on process control variables. Data is gathered
concerning process variables to create time series of data. The paper makes the point that
general IT methods by themselves are not suitable for security of a SCADA system since
those traditional methods do not take into account the physical process.
In the work by Etigown et al. [5], the authors develop a similar system in principle
to the previous mentioned works with a centralized system that serves as a form of access
control. Certain users are permitted to control only specific variables associated with the
cyber-physical system and see only certain variables based on their assigned roles and
privileges.
Table 2.1 summarizes important information from the major works discussed for
ease of comparison. The table includes information, such as the placement of the IDS, the
approach, whether the IDS is capable of preventing intrusions in addition to detecting them,
the sector where the IDS may be applied, and whether ladder logic is evaluated besides
commands that change settings or directly change actuator states.
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Table 2.1: Major Works for Control Command Analysis-Based IDS/IPS

Work

Placement

Approach

Prevention

Sector

Command
Eval.

Program/
Ladder
Logic
Eval.

Chromik

Local

S

Yes

PG

Yes

No

Lin

Central

S

Yes

PG

Yes

No

Etigowni

Central

S

Yes

PG

Yes

Yes

Werth

Local

S&L

Yes

ICS

Yes

Yes

L = learned, S = specification, ICS - Industrial Control System (General),
PG = Power Grid

2.3. The Need for a Novel IPS
All of these aforementioned works make meaningful contributions to IDS for
cyber-physical systems. However, they are limited to power systems only. They assume
that that the topology of the power systems is readily available and other information such
as branch impedance, transformers, generation and loads are readily available since such
information is used by computer systems to simulate the effects of a fault to determine if
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the power system remains robust to a single fault. Such an assumption may be made in
many cases for power systems, since it can be argued that the information is available for
fault detection and diagnosis. However, not all the information on the physical system is
readily available for every type of cyber-physical system. Another issue with constraining
the physical system to only power systems is that these systems will have an almost
immediate effect once they receive a change in breaker status or another change in the
power grid, such as a load added or a generation unit added. Such behavior is not
representative of all systems or processes in other domains of engineering, which have
slower response times, meaning that the safety violation will not occur as quickly. In
addition, the commands themselves in the related works other than this dissertation from
Table 2.1 have an immediate and direct effect on the actuators of the physical system.
These works do not account for the cases in which the command can change the settings
of a program running the PLC or the program itself. What is needed to improve security in
contrast is to be able to handle a wider variety of industrial control systems besides power
systems and also have broader understanding of the threat due to commands and even
malicious program uploads.

2.4 Other Influential Works
Several works were influential to the development of this present work. These
works have key features and concepts that this dissertation builds upon. The work by
Hadžiosmanovic et al. does not assume a model of the physical system is known a priori
[6] but is generated using empirical data of a water tank system. Hadžiosmanovic uses
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autoregression (AR) to make predictions of general trends for process variables. AR is a
method that will be extended and described later in this work, to serve as a basic model of
the physical system. However, in Hadžiosmanovic’s work, the model is not used to predict
the behavior of a command before it is processed. The model is used instead to predict
what the behavior of sensor data should be according to the model based on previous
readings of the sensor. The IDS compares this expected behavior as determined by an AR
model system with the current reading of the sensor data. If there is a significant deviation,
that deviation is considered an abnormality and a potential sign of a cyber-attack against
the integrity of sensor data, such as a Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack. Hadžiosmanovic
used a network-based, centralized IDS. Data is gathered concerning process variables from
the packets collected by network sensors associated with a network-based IDS to create
time series of data of the physical sensor readings. The centralized IDS creates "shadow
memory maps" of the PLCs. The work also describes four general groups of PLC variables:
1. Control - setpoints, actuator settings
2. Reporting - alarms, events
3. Measurement - readings from field devices and sensors
4. Program state - program counters, clocks, and timeouts
Note that variables either (i) change continuously and gradually over time (Group 3), (ii)
reflect attribute data that draws from a discrete set of possible values (Groups 2 and 4), or
(iii) never change or hardly ever change (Group 1). The notion of a shadow memory map
is important because the current work also uses a shadow memory map. The work [11] by
Carcano et al. involves critical state analysis and a distance metric. Critical states are finite
in number and known in advance. At a certain distance from the critical state, a warning
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can be issued. Detecting when variables enter critical states is useful for IDS. The challenge
is to be able to do so within a reasonable amount of time even with many PLCs and critical
states. But Carcano’s work does not make a prediction that the cyber-physical system is
headed toward a critical state. The work only indicates if the system is in a critical state or
what is the current distance between the state of the physical system and the critical state.
Other relevant research includes works that evaluate the PLC code and every path of
execution to determine if some defined set of undesired states is reached. However, without
knowledge of or a model of the dynamics of the physical system, those methods are very
limited in being able to detect malicious code that impact the physical system [7, 8, 9].

2.5 Relevant Literature on the Threat Model for Cyber-Physical Systems
In addition to gaining an understanding of the relevant intrusion detection and
prevention system of this work, it is also important to understand how a threat can take
advantage of cyber-physical systems to cause harm. This enables a better understanding of
how to detect and mitigate against the attack. The study of cyber-physical systems,
including cybersecurity of these systems in particular, is an interdisciplinary pursuit.
Concepts of control systems and computer science as well as those of many engineering
fields have become intertwined. Malicious changes to software or to settings in
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) or other devices and computer systems associated
with the PLC have implications in the physical world that fall under the domains of
electrical, mechanical, civil, chemical, and control systems engineering as well as others.
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A literature search of related work on how cyber-attacks can impact the physical
world has been also conducted. To better understand the implications of computerized
control systems and their impacts in various physical domains, Hahn et al. describes a
useful framework consisting of a model of a cyber-physical system and a kill chain [15].
The model consists of three main layers: (1) Cyber Layer, (2) Control Layer, (3) and the
Physical Layer. When an electrical engineer or a control system engineer designs a control
system for a given cyber physical system, the engineer uses mathematical abstractions or
creates a block diagram in special design software. The designs must be directly compiled
or written in a programming language which will then be compiled for the actual hardware
of the PLC that controls the physical process. The control layer is thus mapped to the cyber
layer, and it exists in actuality as a compiled program in binary machine code form. It
resides in the memory of the PLC’s hardware and is processed by the CPU of the hardware.
The hardware itself is connected to actuators that influence a physical process that can be
described by an appropriate domain expert. Sensors allow the PLC to have information
about the physical process. The kill chain described in Hahn’s work can be used to
understand how violations of one or more of the components of cybersecurity (availability,
integrity, and confidentiality) can lead to violations of properties of the physical process,
namely stability, safety, and efficiency. Huang [19] provided a seminal work that
investigates the physical and economic consequences of cyber-attacks against integrity and
availability in control systems. Since the threat model of this work involves malicious
entities or processes attempting to change settings through commands of SCADA protocols
and the ladder logic uploads, it must be understood that these are attacks on integrity.
Attacks on the other components are auxiliary attacks in this work. In this work, the
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intrusion prevention system serves as a form of access control with the goal of preventing
integrity attacks.

2.6 Summary
To summarize key concepts from the research literature related to this work,
specification-based IDS is a type of IDS used in cybersecurity for critical infrastructure
where there are well defined conditions for what is normal or abnormal. The general
approach of specification-based IDS uses behavior that is defined as acceptable to compare
against new data to determine if the data deviates from the acceptable behavior. The
specification in this dissertation consists of a model of the physical system and a set of
defined safety violations. The safety violations fall outside of the ranges of values for
process data that are considered acceptable. If the entire specification is developed by users
without automation, the process becomes very tedious. What is desired is that the IDS is
highly deployable, meaning it can be used in many environments with various cyberphysical systems. Therefore, in this dissertation, methods of automating the process of
generating models are studied and experiments are performed to understand their
capabilities and limitations. it is also desired to be able to detect a wide variety of cyberattacks that would cause harm based on their payload. The scope of this work deals with
these kinds of attacks. It should be noted that the scope of this work does not include a
thorough treatment of how nodes in a network become compromised or how the attack
originates. The detection of DoS attacks is also not a major threat that is studied in this
work. However, DoS attacks used in addition to the integrity attacks are of interest. The
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techniques used in this work can be used to complement those that are more adept with the
detection of DoS attacks.
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CHAPTER 3.

PROBLEM FORMULATION

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a
hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will
also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every
battle.”
― Sun Tzu, The Art of War

This chapter establishes theoretical foundations for the architecture of the overall SCADA
System in addition to the threat model of this work. This is done in order to understand the
overall problem and relevant scope of this work. The threat model is studied from multiple
perspectives in terms of the PLC software, kill chains, and the consequences that the threat
has on the cyber-physical system.

3.1. Conceptual Setup
It is necessary to understand a basic configuration of the ICS/SCADA system for this work.
In this work, it is assumed that there are a set of PLCs, each that manage some aspect of a
physical process. The physical process can be said to have multiple inputs and multiple
outputs. This is depicted in Figure 3.1, which shows a typical setup of a SCADA system
relevant to this work, where the physical system is a Multiple Input and Multiple Output
(MIMO) system. Figure 3.2 depicts the simple case: the physical system is a Single Input
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and Single Output (SISO) system. This characterization of physical systems as SISO or
MIMO can be found in works that focus on systems and signals to describe physical
processes [29].

(a)

(b)

Figure 3.1: General Case - Physical System is a MIMO system - (a) with one PLC and
(b) with multiple PLCs.
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Figure 3.2: Simple Case - Physical System is a SISO system
The SCADA System architecture used and studied in this work is the one described by [8].
The following is assumed concerning the SCADA system: First, a PLC or multiple PLCs
directly interface with the physical process or system through a wired connection that
allows for transmission of signals to actuators and from sensors. These actuators and
sensors are connected to the physical process. Actuators are the inputs to the physical
process described above and act on and influence the physical process. Actuators include
devices such as pumps, valves, motors, and heaters. Sensors are outputs of the process and
are devices that can measure various aspects of the physical process, such as pressure,
water level, angular velocity, and temperature. Second, a network facilitates
communication between the PLCs and the Human Machine Interface (HMI). The HMI is
a computer system that is involved in the SCADA system and a human user can interact
with. The purpose of the HMI is to allow a human to oversee the operation of the SCADA
system. More specifically, the SCADA System can be described as follows in terms of five
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major components as explained in [8]: (1) physical system/process, (2) cyber-physical link
(3) PLC, (4) network, and (5) remote monitoring and control, which generally consists of
an HMI. What is also important for this work are the loops - both inner and outer - that
illustrate the flow of information for the SCADA system as seen in the Figure 3.3:

Figure 3.3: SCADA System Decomposed into Major Components with Information
Flows
The focus of the problem for this dissertation is on the outer loop, or the wide-area control
loop, which consists of the network that facilitates communication between the PLC and
HMI. It is typically assumed that the inner loop, or local control loop, has virtually no
attack surface since the sensor and actuator signals travel over wires. Note that the proposed
IPS will examine the commands and program uploads to determine if they are acceptable
for the PLC to execute. If the local control loop does, however, have an attack surface,
another possible way to view the problem is with following alternate setup:
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Figure. 3.4: SCADA System with Simple Devices for PLCs
In Figure 3.4, the slave devices are simple electronic devices. They simply relay
information from the master to directly adjust the state of an actuator and relay information
from the sensor to the master. In this setup, the network is considered vulnerable as in the
previous case. This may be considered a special case of the previous setup.
This dissertation deals with PLCs that have more distributed control and have their
own ladder logic, which is the primary software run on PLCs to regulate the physical
process. Therefore, the PLCs have their own degree of autonomy, which can be referred to
as an “automatic mode” in the ladder logic program. However, the PLCs may be placed in
what is referred to as a “manual mode” where the HMI or other remote monitoring center
can control the states of the actuators connected to the plant directly via commands through
the network. This “manual mode” causes the PLCs to be treated as these simple devices,
meaning they do not have their own autonomy.
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3.2. A Closer Look at the Threat Model
With the setup described, it is next important to examine the vulnerabilities of SCADA
systems and how cyber-attacks can take advantage of them. SCADA systems have certain
things in common with conventional IT networks, especially since the networks may be
made with common commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components and use many of the
same network protocols, such as the TCP/IP stack, which has at its core the Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP). SCADA systems are similar to IT
networks even though some protocols are specific to SCADA systems. The specific
SCADA protocols often reside in the application layer of the TCP/IP stack although not
always. Therefore, many core principles of cybersecurity as they relate to TCP/IP networks
apply to SCADA systems.
From a conventional perspective, cybersecurity has several main components that
form the CIA triad: (1) confidentiality, (2) integrity, and (3) availability [58].
Confidentiality involves hiding information or causing it to be largely unreadable to
outsiders by means of encryption so that an adversary cannot know the information. If the
adversary is able to access and understand the information the adversary can potentially
use the information for later exploits. Although important, confidentiality is not dealt with
directly in this work. Integrity means that an item has not been tampered with or that there
is no deceptive information. A specific type of integrity important to this work is data
integrity for network packets, meaning that the content of the network packets is not
modified by an unauthorized party. Another related concept is authentication.
Authentication means that the process or device that uses a resource is who or what it
claims to be. In this work authentication is not addressed directly from a conventional
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perspective. However, it is still important to consider authentication since an entity which
is able to authenticate itself has the potential to compromise data, thus affecting integrity.
This work deals directly with data integrity. Finally, availability involves resources
remaining available for use in a timely manner. These aspects of cybersecurity must be
maintained in order for a given computer system or network to function properly [58]. In
the case of this work, the focus is on attacks on integrity and availability as far as network
security is concerned. These two aspects of security are especially important for SCADA
systems because unwanted and potentially dangerous behavior can occur on the physical
system if these components are violated. Therefore, this work focuses on certain attacks
that are meant to attack integrity and to a limited extent availability of the network such
that the attacks would influence the behavior of the industrial control system.
The basic threat model of this work includes malicious command packets and
ladder logic programs that are sent to PLCs to violate the integrity of the settings and code
in the memory of the PLC and ultimately affect the physical system to cause harm. For this
work, harm or maliciousness is defined as causing the cyber-physical system to enter into
an undesired state, whether that state be unsafe or inefficient. The following is assumed
about these malicious attacks with regard to their origin in this work: (1) They may
originate from a foreign node that is able to connect to the ICS network (Figure 3.5a). (2)
They may also originate from a trusted system in the network, such as an HMI, or a trusted
server, where the trusted system has become compromised (Figure 3.5b). As discussed
previously, the word “trust” in cybersecurity implies that a system is considered safe or
acceptable to use or transact with whether in communication or in transferring
data/instructions and is not compromised. Oftentimes, trusted systems are whitelisted by
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the operator of the SCADA system so that other systems that are associated with or depend
on the trusted system will be able to identify (perhaps by IP address) the trusted system by
the fact that it can be found in the white list. Note, this simple approach is not totally
effective since it leaves the possibility for spoofing attacks and insiders who proceed to
send malicious commands and programs from systems that are white-listed.

(a).

(b)

Figure 3.5: (a) Foreign node [Represented in red] with access to the ICS/SCADA
Network; (b) Compromised trusted node [HMI in red] already given access to the
ICS/SCADA Network
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The Moroochi attack is an example of a foreign node connecting to a network and initiating
an attack. Stuxnet and the Ukrainian attack are examples of trusted nodes on the network
becoming compromised and initiating an attack. In the case of Stuxnet, the trusted PC
networked to the PLC became compromised. With the Ukrainian attack, trusted computers
that human operators used in the control room were infected by malware that provided a
remote connection to attackers.
In contrast to Cardenas’ work [23] that deals with cyber-attacks on control systems,
the focus of the cyber-attacks of this work is not on the inner loop of the control system.
That is, the loop that consists of the flow of sensor data from the plant or physical system
to the controller and the flow of actuator data from the controller to the plant. Cardenas
assumes that communication between the PLC and the instrumentation, which include the
sensors and actuators is facilitated through a network.

The network is, of course,

vulnerable to cyber-attacks, such as injection attacks and Man in the Middle (MitM)
attacks. Such a setup may be considered similar to the SCADA system with simple devices
in this work. This current work, as mentioned, focuses on the supervisory loop in which
network traffic between the PLC and the HMI occurs. This network traffic consists of
Modbus over TCP packets. Part of the threat model in this work is based on a subset of the
threats described by Morris and Gao [16]. The threats that are of interest include Command
Injection Attacks, which are the Malicious State Command Injection (MSCI) attacks,
Malicious Parameter Command Injection (MPCI)) and Malicious Programmation Upload.
Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks are also relevant since they are capable of manipulating
command packets in transit and therefore capable of manipulating the settings of PLCs. A
MitM attack involves a malicious node or device on the network intercepting packets
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transferred between two communicating systems on the same network. A method of
accomplishing this that is commonly used is Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)
poisoning, where the malicious system will broadcast incorrect ARP mappings [51]. As a
result, the affected systems send packets meant for another device to the malicious or
compromised device. If the attacker can access the packets being sent legitimately through
the network, the attacker is able to eavesdrop on the communication and also alter the
communication.

3.2.1 Threat Model from Perspective of Kill Chain
The threat model should be understood in terms of the cyber-physical kill chain. A kill
chain is essentially a sequence of steps that an attack takes to achieve its objective. The kill
chain is an important concept since it supports the understanding that there is a progression
that takes place for the attack to have its effect. One such kill chain useful to this work is
seen in Figure 3.6 below and described by Hahn et al [15]:

Figure 3.6: Cyber Kill Chain (Adopted from Hahn et al [15])
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Per Figure 3.6, Hahn et al. illustrates a conventional kill chain for a cyber-attack at the top
and a kill chain of an attack for a cyber-physical system at the bottom for the sake of
comparison. The cyber-physical kill chain has its origins in computer systems and
networks, as does this present work, and ends with consequences in the physical world.
This is important for this work since the threat model must be understood in terms of its
physical consequences. The threat model of this work is similar to another threat model
which consists of attacks that cause safety violations and inefficiencies for the SCADA
system [23].
The steps for the cyber-physical attack required to achieve its final attack are as
follows [15]: (1) Reconnaissance, which can be performed for all three layers according to
Hahn’s work - physical, control, and cyber; (2) Weaponize, which uses information gained
in the reconnaissance step to develop and perform an effective attack; (3) Deliver, which
involves actions to take the attack to the target; (4) Cyberexecution, which amounts to
executing exploits or other actions to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability;
(5) Perturb Control, which occurs as a result of the cyber execution, especially against
settings or logic of the PLC; and (6) Physical Objective, which is ultimately met in terms
of destruction, disruption, or cost. In this work, for some of the attacks, reconnaissance is
performed to gain knowledge of the physical states stored in the PLC which come from the
sensors. This is done so as to make a decision on when to attack and then weaponize some
of the injection attacks of Gao’s taxonomy to affect settings and setpoints associated with
the PLC to perturb the cyber-physical system to an unsafe condition.
Additionally, another kill chain for cyber-physical systems is one described by
SANS [72]. This kill chain is defined in two stages: (1) Intrusion and (2) ICS Attack. The
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first stage is focused on an attacker penetrating important networks and computer systems
associated with the ICS to perform reconnaissance and gain insight. The second stage is
about using that insight to develop cyber weapons that can affect the ICS and even physical
processes. If this dissertation is described in terms of the SANS kill chain, this work does
not explore the first stage. Instead this work mainly deals with the second stage, and the
threat is assumed to have reached an advanced phase of the ICS cyber kill chain. In this
work, the cyber-attack has reached Stage 2 and specifically the “Deliver” phase before the
phases (1) Install / Modify and (2) Execute ICS Attack. The “deliver” phase corresponds
to a rogue device sending a command or ladder logic upload request to the PLC in this
dissertation. Installing/Modifying corresponds to the PLC updating a register in response
to a command or loading the new ladder logic program. Executing the ICS Attack
corresponds to letting the PLC run with the new setting or program. The cyber kill chain is
described in work [55]. These advanced phases are worth studying since the attacker cannot
hide its true intentions based on what is in the payload, which consists of the harmful
command or ladder logic program.
3.2.2 Threat Model from Perspective of PLC Software
The threat model affecting the PLC software that can lead to consequences to the physical
process is described as three main layers due their distinctions from one another (See
Figure 3.7). These consist of Layer 2 - commands born of the SCADA network and sent
to the PLC which direct the PLC to change settings, states, or output of the PLC, Layer 1 Programmation/Ladder Logic Updates, and Layer 0 - Firmware Updates. The paper [26]
uses the convention of making the firmware (Layer 0) and the ladder logic (Layer 1)
distinct abstraction layers, which this work also does. Note that the firmware updates are
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out of scope of this work but still worthwhile to investigate. Malicious firmware updates
may require a full virtual machine or emulated device to investigate changes of underlying
software. Virtual machines have much greater complexity and fidelity to evaluate such
threats than simply a process in an operating system. The following figure illustrates this
organization of the threat model:

Layer 2 - Settings: Internal parameters or settings within the ladder logic and States of
the actuator directly affecting the output (PLC registers).

Layer 1 - Programmation: Ladder Logic Program with inputs, outputs, states, and
timers

Layer 0 - Firmware: OS, Kernel, drivers for hardware, supporting software

Figure 3.7: Layers of PLC Software Relevant to the Threat Model - Green (focus of
this work)
3.2.2.1. Layer 0
The firmware is the lowest layer of software found on the PLC. The firmware consists of
drivers for the hardware that serve as the interface for the ladder logic to retrieve input
values and to set output for the hardware components of the PLC. The firmware may also
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be involved in network communication. This firmware typically has an operating system,
such as Linux or a Real Time Operating System (RTOS). The firmware may include a
hardware abstraction layer that allows a OS to interface with multiple computer
architectures and variants of commonly found hardware such as communication interfaces,
general purpose inputs and outputs, and memory. The firmware may alternatively be a bare
metal programmation that includes drivers and code to execute the PLC programmation.
Bare metal implementations repeat a fixed set of operations in a loop.
3.2.2.2. Layer 1
The programmation consists of the ladder logic program, which serves as the software for
the PLC that regulates the physical process. For this specific work, the ladder logic is
assumed to be in Structured Text (ST) code to be compiled by OpenPLC on the given PLC
before it is run. The ladder logic is characterized by a scan cycle, in which input to the PLC
presumably coming from sensors is read and new outputs of the PLC are computed based
on the internal logic of the program. This scan cycle is repeated continuously during the
operation of the industrial plant that the PLC controls.
3.2.2.3. Layer 2
The programmation or ladder logic will have internal states or settings that may be
modified by the operator. These settings exist as registers in the memory of a PLC.
Examples of these settings may be setpoints, such as the setpoint for a
Proportional/Integral/Derivative (PID) controller, or high low and low setpoints for an
on/off controller. Other settings are the gains of the PID controller or other control
algorithm. The output of the PLC is important to consider since it directly affects the
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physical plant. It should be noted that the PLC’s output is essentially affected indirectly by
changes in layer 1, and even layer 0 if the driver software is modified. For a PLC running
a simple program, it is conceivable that in typical operation of a SCADA system that
oversees the PLC, an operator may wish to change the output of the PLC, such as in the
case of a breaker in a power grid. The operator would be using manual mode. Note that
with more complex ladder logic, the ladder logic may be such that the output is given an
updated value every scan cycle, which would override any attempt by an external request
to change the value.
What is of interest in this work is an adversary that can change layers 1 and 2. In
order for malware to make changes to these layers, commands are sent to the PLC to change
the values of registers, which may be outputs or internal settings (Layer 2). To change the
ladder logic, the ladder logic upload request is sent to the PLC (Layer 1). The work by Qian
[38] focuses on layer 2 to be able to detect harmful commands to change the parameters
before processing them, but does not investigate the possibility of harmful ladder logic,
which is limited in detecting potential attacks. And the methods of that work are mainly
limited to on/off controllers. It is, however, possible for the designer of the software to
predetermine appropriate ranges for the settings of the software and to validate incoming
commands sent to change registers. However, an adversary that is able to change the ladder
logic used for validation by sending a malware upload request may be able to replace the
validation code. The focus of the work in [20] is on layers 1 and 2 to introduce a proof of
concept of ladder logic malware and its potential effects. Note in [20] changes to layer 0
fall outside of the scope because it is assumed that only the manufacturer of the PLC can
make those changes by means of authentication, via Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to
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confirm that the upload actually comes from the manufacturer. In fact, in the paper [20],
the authors experimented with trying to change the firmware but were unable to do so
easily because of the authentication scheme in place. However, they were able to change
the ladder logic maliciously.

3.3. Mechanisms for the Threat
There are a few major mechanisms through which the threat may advance. These
mechanisms allow an adversary that exists as a compromised legitimate node in the
network or as a foreign node described previously to perform the attack to affect the
settings and programmation in the PLC. These mechanisms include the SCADA network
protocol and ladder logic uploads.
3.3.1 SCADA Network Protocols
In this work for the experiments, Modbus was selected for the protocol because of its wide
use in industrial control systems. These experiments also can be conceivably performed
with other SCADA protocols such as Profibus, DNP3, and Siemen’s S7 protocol. Modbus
has several types of packets as indicated by function codes. Common function codes
include the following as seen in Table 3.1 that includes their function code and description:
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Table 3.1: Relevant Modbus Commands and Requests

Function Code

Function Name

1

Read Coils

2

Read Discrete Inputs

3

Read Multiple Holding Registers

4

Read Input Registers

5

Read Single Coil

6

Write Single Holding Register

15

Write Multiple Coils

16

Write Multiple Holding Registers

Note that the coils are binary discrete variables that take on a 0 or 1 for a value. In other
words, they are Boolean variables. On the other hand, the term “register” denotes a variable
that can take on a range of values. A register in this work is made up of two bytes and is
essentially a type of integer. In this work, write Modbus packets (Those with Function
Codes = 5, 6, 15, 16) are of most concern since they are the ones that can potentially impact
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the physical process directly or change the settings, such as the gain and setpoint in the
ladder logic program, which indirectly determine the behavior of the control algorithm
implemented in the ladder logic of the PLC. These write Modbus commands affect Layer
2. The Write Modbus packets take the following form as seen in Table 3.2. Table 3.3
dissects the Modbus packet with descriptions of each field.
Table 3.2: Example of Write Modbus Packet

Field #

1

2

3

4

5

Bytes (Hex)

11

01

0001

0005

9A9B

Table 3.3: Write Modbus Packet Fields

Field #

Name

Data

1

The Slave Address (11 hex = address17 )

11

2

The Function Code 6 (Preset Single Register)

06

3

The Data Address of the register.

0001

( 0001 hex = 1 , + 40001 offset = register #40002 )

4

The value to write

0005
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5

The CRC (cyclic redundancy check) for error checking.

9A9B

However, the Read packets are also important to this work because they allow for
the proposed IPS to monitor the states of process variables. If an HMI or other device on a
SCADA network wishes to write to or read from a register from a given PLC, the device
must send a request packet to the PLC. The PLC will then send a response packet. The
Modbus protocol exists in main forms: (1) Modbus over Serial Line and (2) Modbus/TCP.
Modbus over Serial Line, the older of the two, has frames resembling the packets shown
in Tables 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6. On the other hand, if the network is a modern computer network
that uses the TCP/IP stack, then the Modbus read or write messages will be in the
application layer of the packets sent over the network as opposed to simply being a frame
sent over a bus. Modbus/TCP packets place the frame from Tables 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6 in the
payload of a TCP packet. For this network, each of the nodes including the PLC and HMI
will be assigned an IP address typical of a computer on a network. An example of the
Modbus single register read request sent by the HMI is seen in Table 3.4. Table 3.5 breaks
down the example into its fields with description.
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Table 3.4: Example of Request Modbus Packet

Field #

1

2

3

4

5

Bytes (Hex)

11

01

0013

0025

0E84

Table 3.5: Request Modbus Packet Fields

Field #

Name

Data

1

The Slave Address (11 hex = address17 )

11

2

The Function Code 1 (read Coil Status)

01

3

The Data Address of the first coil to read.

0013

( 0013 hex = 19 , + 1 offset = coil #20 )

4

The total number of coils requested. (25 hex = 37, inputs 20 to 0025
56 )

5

The CRC (cyclic redundancy check) for error checking.

0E84

Likewise, the single register “read” response which follows from the PLC to the HMI is
depicted as follows as seen in Tables 3.6 and 3.7.
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Table 3.6: Example of Response Modbus Packet

Field #

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Bytes (Hex)

11

01

05

CD

6B

B2

0E

1B

45E6

Table 3.7: Response Modbus Packet Fields

Field #

Name

Data

1

The Slave Address (11 hex = address17 )

11

2

The Function Code 1 (read Coil Status)

01

3

The number of data bytes to follow (37 Coils / 8 bits per byte = 5 05
bytes)

4

Coils 27 - 20 (1100 1101)

CD

5

Coils 35 - 28 (0110 1011)

6B

6

Coils 43 - 36 (1011 0010)

B2
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7

Coils 51 - 44 (0000 1110)

0E

8

3 space holders & Coils 56 - 52 (0001 1011)

1B

9

The CRC (cyclic redundancy check)

45E6

The reason that it is helpful to examine the contents and structure of a typical Modbus
message is that the threat model of this work is one where the attacker appears to be normal
or legitimate. Therefore, if the attacker wishes to manipulate specific Modbus registers, it
must send legitimately constructed Modbus messages to do so. The attack can inject these
packets for example into the network to the PLC.
The overall SCADA network regime for communication used in this work is the
request/response approach, also known as the polling. This is not the only approach in
SCADA systems but it is widely used. Other regimes include (1) Strobe, where a request
message is broadcast to all of the nodes on the network or bus and a subset of the nodes
respond, (2) Cyclic, where the nodes update their status to the master device at regular
intervals, and (3) Change-of-State, where the nodes only update when their state, which
are typically the contents of the registers or coils in memory, has changed [63].
3.3.2 Updating Ladder Logic Software
In order to affect Layer 1 as described previously, new ladder logic will have to be uploaded
to the PLC. In OpenPLC, the PLC used for this work, a web interface of OpenPLC allows
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a user or a process on a computer connected to the SCADA network to upload a new ladder
logic program. ST code of the Ladder logic is submitted by the user or process through the
web interface. This is analogous to a binary file being sent to the PLC, even if the code is
not compiled first before transmission. It is worth noting that a rogue device connected to
the network can upload malicious ladder logic to the PLC.
In the works by Irfan et al., the authors describe a computer, which may be the same
computer that serves as the HMI. The computer includes the engineering software, which
are defined as the software tools for designing ladder logic to be uploaded to the PLC. The
PLC is assumed to be networked with the computer [63]. For this dissertation, the PLCopen
editor or OpenPLC editor (a modification of the former) is used as the engineering
software. The OpenPLC editor allows a user to create ladder logic programs in a GUI
environment which can be converted to ST code and compiled by the OpenPLC software.
3.4 Summary
This chapter described a typical SCADA system and the means by which a threat actor
may perform integrity attacks by maliciously changing settings and programming. To
proceed to understand how such integrity attacks can affect the physical process under
control of the PLC, it is necessary to understand how and why a PLC is typically
programmed and how the PLC may be manipulated.
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CHAPTER 4.

BACKGROUND ON PLCS AND RELATED
CONCEPTS

This chapter follows from the previous chapter to explain the PLC and its programming.
Chapter 3 discussed the SCADA system’s overall architecture and the major threats that
exist as commands in the network and ladder logic uploads. This chapter goes further by
describing PLCs and their purpose in the SCADA system to regulate physical processes.
Key concepts are discussed in order to understand the threat model and specifically how
attacks can affect the PLC’s program to cause instability or lack of safety for various
common control algorithms.
4.1. PLCs and Their Function
Since one of the main focuses of this work is the PLC itself, it is important to understand
the PLC’s role and function in the SCADA system and how the PLC is programmed and
designed to control the physical system. A PLC typically has a set of registers and coils
that make up its memory. These may be used for input and output and for general
information storage and settings used by the internal program running on the PLC.
OpenPLC, the PLC used in this work, uses this setup [4]. As far as PLC programs are
concerned, PLCs used in various engineering domains (i.e., electrical, chemical, robotics)
are typically programmed with a form of feedback control. In this scheme, the sensor
information that is indicative of the current state of the physical process under control is
relayed to the PLC so that the PLC can act through actuators to influence the behavior of
the physical system based on the sensor information. The state of the physical system may
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include such physical quantities as temperature, voltage, or pressure depending on the
particular application. This state is generally referred to as the process variable (PV). The
PLC with its internal program will receive the sensor information and make a decision on
how to control the actuators based on its internal program, the sensor data and register
values. Generally, the control algorithm or program in the PLC has a certain goal or
setpoint to achieve that is determined by an engineer or user. The setpoint (SP) is the
desired value for the process variable. The controller must manipulate the actuators, which
directly act on the controlled variable (CV) to cause the process variable to reach the
setpoint or be maintained between two setpoints in some cases (a minimum and a
maximum). PLCs are connected to actuators and sensors through wires or simple network
protocols. The programs designed for PLCs are typically created in ladder logic or one of
the five languages for PLCs according to the IEC 61131–3 standards. OpenPLC is
compliant with all 5 languages from the IEC 61131–3 standard [4]. Figure 4.1 illustrates
these feedback control systems.

Fig. 4.1: Feedback Control System
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4.2.

Common PLC/Ladder Logic Programs

Several important algorithms make use of a feedback approach for controlling industrial
processes.

The

focus

of

this

work

is

on

the

hysteresis

control

and

Programmable/Integral/Derivative (PID) control algorithms. This work also considers the
P and PI control variants of PID.
4.2.1 Hysteresis Controller The hysteresis controller, also known as an on-off controller,
is a common type of controller, where there are two main discrete states for the actuator,
rather than a range of values that the actuator may take on. The actuator is said to be either
“on” or “off” in other words. A well-known example is a thermostat, which can either turn
on or off the heat according to its programming. A thermostat, in addition to other on-off
controllers, typically has a main setpoint determined by a user and two setpoints – high and
low setpoints – that are at offsets slightly above and below the main setpoint. With the two
states of the actuator, this type of controller is able to cause the process variable to either
increase or decrease to keep the process between the two setpoints. If the PV reaches or
goes below the low setpoint (SPLow). Then the controller must choose the actuator state that
causes the PV to increase (CVinc). On the other hand, if the PV reaches the high setpoint
(SPHigh) or is above it, the control must choose the actuator state that causes it to decrease
(CVdec). The following piecewise formula defines the behavior that the controller must
have for its actuator, which affects the control variable:
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4.2.2 Proportional/Integral/Derivative (PID) Controller The PID Controller is a
commonly used controller in many applications. It allows for a smooth approach for
reaching the setpoint, which is desired or necessary in certain applications. In the book by
Erickson [3], the relevant theory of PID control algorithms are discussed specifically for
how they would be implemented in a PLC. The feedback control system in Figure 4.1
applies to the PID controller. In fact, the diagram in Figure 4.2 below can be seen as
replacing the “Controller” box of Figure 4.1. The process variable reading, which is
determined by the incoming sensor data, is subtracted from the setpoint resulting in a value
called the error (e). The goal is for the error to be zero or as close to zero as possible, at
which point, the process variable has reached the setpoint. If the process variable is higher
or lower than the setpoint, the controller must take action through the controlled variable
(CV) to counteract that error using what is called negative feedback. Figure 4.2 shows a
common PID controller. This diagram of Figure 4.1 follows from the previous image in
Figure 4.1. The PID controller has a set of gain parameters (Kp, Ki, Kd). The parameters
Kp, Ti, Td may also be used instead and have slightly different meanings.
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Figure 4.2: PID Controller
The controller is designed such that the CV, which is what the actuator directly controls
and is determined by the controller, may be proportional to the error, the time derivative of
the error, time integral of the error, or a linear combination of two or more of these. The
CV is thus calculated with the following formula:

Where Kp, Ki, and Kd are the gain parameters and appear as coefficients for proportional,
integral, and derivative terms respectively; e is error. The error is calculated as follows:
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However, the above form is in continuous form and is not generally realizable in a digital
control system, where there is a discrete periodic update of the actuator state by the program
called the scan cycle. The scan cycle of the PLC that carries out the update is a process
whereby a PLC takes inputs, which come from the sensors and processes them according
to its ladder logic program and its internal states and then produces outputs, that govern the
behavior of the actuators. This scan cycle is performed at regular intervals at discrete points
in time. Therefore, a discrete mathematical expression must be used. With this type of
controller, there are certain concerns. A different form is therefore used as follows, where
n represents discrete points in time at intervals equal to the scan time. This is as follows:

Below is the formula that is reflected in the PID ladder logic of this work. Through
manipulating the above formula this one can be obtained. This form is referred to as the
velocity form as explained in [3]:

Where TI = 1/KI, TD = 1/KD, T = Scan Time.
A major case of the above formula that is used in this work is for at PI controller, which
lacks the deterative term:
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Or

As was implied previously, this formula or mathematical abstraction must be implemented
in code in actuality. The following code snippet shows how this can be implemented in ST
code:

FUNCTION_BLOCK PID
VAR_INPUT
AUTO : BOOL ;

(* 0 - manual , 1 - automatic *)

PV : REAL ;

(* Process variable *)

SP : REAL ;

(* setpoint *)

X0 : REAL ;

(* Manual output adjustment - *)
(*

Typically

from

transfer

station *)
KP : REAL ;

(* Proportionality constant *)

TR : REAL ;

(* Reset time *)

TD : REAL ;

(* Derivative time constant *)

CYCLE : TIME ;

(* Sampling period *)

END_VAR
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VAR_OUTPUT CV : REAL; END_VAR
VAR ERROR : REAL ;

(* PV - SP *)

VAR PREVERROR : REAL ;
VAR PREVCV : REAL ;
END_VAR
ERROR := PV - SP ;
CV = PREVCV + Kp*(ERROR - PREVERROR) + CYCLE/TR*ERROR
PREVERROR = ERROR
PREVCV = CV
END_FUNCTION_BLOCK

Figure 4.3: Main ST Code for PI Controller

4.2.3 Modes of Operation in PLCs. The types of controllers described above may be
considered as automatic since the controller can regulate a physical process without direct
intervention except for changes in settings done at a supervisory level. Examples of settings
are the high and low setpoints for the hysteresis controller or the main setpoint of a PID
controller. The ladder logic implemented in a PLC typically consists of multiple modes
that can be selected by the user. One common mode is manual mode in which an operator
who is communicating with the PLC via an HMI over a network has direct control of the
actuators. A second common mode is automatic mode. For this work automatic modes are
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either implemented as hysteresis control or PID control. The current mode is typically
stored as setting in a register of the PLC.
4.3 General Safety and Stability Concerns
For a given plant, there are general ranges of values for the process variable that are
considered acceptable from a safety perspective. There are some ways to choose
parameters in the PID or a setpoint that would be unacceptable and could lead to physical
processes to veer outside of this safety region. This is also true for the hysteresis controller.
For example, a high setpoint could be chosen that is above an upper bound of a safe region
of behavior for the process variable. A PLC should never drive the PV outside of these
safety conditions based on its program or settings. For example, negative setting values for
a PID controller’s gains would cause a PID controller to be unstable and cause the PV to
move away from the setpoint. Besides situations where the PV is driven outside safety
conditions, it is also possible that the controller is unstable in other ways. It may behave
erratically and not be able to settle to a given setpoint. A very large value of the integral
parameter in the PID controller for example may cause the control system to have a very
high overshoot or have oscillatory behavior. A large proportional parameter in the PID in
conjunction with the large integral parameter can further the instability. Other concerns for
how the controller could regulate the physical process adversely is in terms of efficiency.
One way to look at efficiency is the cost for manipulating the actuators by the controller.
The controller takes various actions through its actuators. The reason that there is a cost
associated with the control system is that actuators generally have a cost associated with
them when they are active or switched on. In that case the actuators are consuming fuel or
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electricity, which have associated costs. There may be some control schemes that are more
optimal in terms of cost.
It should be noted that concerning stability, there are analytical techniques in
control systems theory to determine if a given controller used with a given plant is stable
or not. This is especially true for PID controllers. These techniques are not employed in
this dissertation because what is assumed in those techniques is that the control law is in
an abstract mathematical expression that can be used in analysis. However, the control
algorithm in this work when it is evaluated exists as a program or binary executable. It is
very difficult or nearly impossible to reconstruct the mathematical representation from a
binary executable. Instead of focusing on an abstract expression, methods for determining
instability or overall behavior of the ladder logic can be done by running the code
dynamically in a sandboxed environment. Such methods are used in the next chapter to
make determinations on the ladder logic on whether it would be harmful to the overall
SCADA system.
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CHAPTER 5.

DESIGN OF NOVEL INTRUSION PREVENTION
SYSTEM

This chapter explains the Embedded Process Prediction Intrusion Prevention System
(EPPIPS). EPPIPS is a novel specification-based IPS that resides inside a PLC and screens
all commands before allowing them to alter PLC settings to ensure the physical process
remains in a safe state.
The remainder of this chapter begins with an overview and description of EPPIPS
and a detailed operation of EPPIPS. Following the explanation of EPPIPS, the chapter
provides a description of the differences and similarities of another common and relevant
device called the System-Instrumented System (SIS), which may be used in tandem with
EPPIPS. Afterward, a description is given for the overall implementation and placement
details for EPPIPS. Lastly, the chapter ends with hypotheses including the requirements
for EPPIPS, which must be verified through experimentation.
5.1 Overview and Description of EPPIPS
EPPIPS is a software-based module that executes inside the PLC as a stand-alone
process. EPPIPS acts as a proxy between the main PLC process and the main SCADA
network by intercepting all network traffic between the PLC and HMI and relaying all
communication between the two. Figure 5.1 illustrates EPPIPS’s design. EPPIPS consists
of two major submodules: (1) the main submodule and (2) the prediction submodule. The
main submodule intercepts network traffic sent from the HMI to the PLC. Command
packets are evaluated before being sent to the PLC. The main submodule includes a shadow
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memory. The shadow memory stores a local copy of the contents of the PLC’s memory.
The contents of the shadow memory are obtained by examining the contents of read and
write Modbus queries and responses that pass through EPPIPS. When the main submodule
detects a Modbus query that includes a command to change a PLC setting, the current
settings stored in the shadow memory including those affected by the command are sent to
the prediction submodule. The prediction submodule then predicts the effect of the
command using the shadow memory to determine the physical system’s state and using an
Auto-Regressive Moving Average (ARMA) model of the physical process. The main
submodule uses the prediction result to evaluate the command and determine if the
command should be forwarded to the PLC or if the command should be dropped. The
following subsections provide an in-depth description of the submodules.
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Figure 5.1: Overview of EPPIPS
5.1.1 Main Submodule
The EPPIPS module uses its main submodule to relay the request packets coming
from the HMI to the PLC (depicted as arrows moving toward PLC in Fig. 5.1). The main
submodule also receives the resulting response packets from the PLC and stores the
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packets’ data in its shadow memory. EPPIPS observes both the request packets, which
contain memory addresses, and the response packets, which contain the data stored at those
addresses. Using the information from the request and response packets, EPPIPS duplicates
the registers and coils of the PLC actually monitoring and controlling the physical process
in the shadow memory for analysis and situational awareness. The shadow memory stores
the information as lists of tuples in a dictionary. The tuples include the memory address of
a register, the register’s contents, and a timestamp. The shadow memory stores the most
current sensor data observed from Modbus queries. The shadow memory performs two
vital functions for EPPIPS: (1) The shadow memory stores the current state of the physical
process and provides the state information to the prediction submodule, and (2) the shadow
memory logs time-series data for training purposes. The shadow memory has two modes
of operation: (1) Passive and (2) Active. In the passive mode, EPPIPS observes Modbus
communication between the HMI and the PLC to reconstruct registers and their contents
(inputs, outputs, holding registers and coils). In the active mode, EPPIPS directly sends
request packets to the PLC to obtain current values in registers. This mode is useful in cases
where (1) HMI polling is not frequent enough to determine states of the registers; (2) the
HMI does not request certain desired information, such as the contents of a specific register
or coil; and (3) the HMI is compromised and not behaving correctly. The timestamp is a
useful indicator of the “freshness” of the data. This information can be compared to the
current time to determine whether it is appropriate for the EPPIPS to request current
information from the PLC regarding its state.
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5.1.2 Prediction Submodule
The other major component of EPPIPS, the prediction submodule, consists of a
modified OpenPLC process (ModOpenPLC). ModOpenPLC is a process designed to
represent the main PLC process that is actually controlling the physical system.
ModOpenPLC’s purpose is to test hypothetical scenarios of what would occur on the main
PLC process if the PLC processed the packet. ModOpenPLC is similar to the main PLC
process in that ModOpenPLC functions by running scan cycles over many iterations. One
main difference between the two is that ModOpenPLC does not have an added delay
between scan cycles. The next scan cycle is immediately executed. On the other hand, in
the main PLC process controlling the physical process, the main task of the scan cycle
occurs at regular fixed intervals of time defined by the ladder logic program because the
PLC process must interact with the real world. The main task embodying the scan cycle
performs three steps: (1) read inputs, (2) process iteration of ladder logic, and (3) write to
outputs. This main task takes a very small amount of time compared with the interval.
Therefore, time remains in the interval in which the main process is idle. ModOpenPLC
also performs the same three steps described above for the main PLC process and
additionally executes a fourth step (4), which is to update the model. ModOpenPLC lacks
any idle period so that predictions can be made quickly over a number of scan cycles.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the cyclical task each interval.
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Figure 5.2: Scan Cycles for (a) Main PLC Process and (b) ModOpenPLC (Not
drawn to scale)
The total time incurred by ModOpenPLC to run the scan cycles for the prediction is the
latency, a metric that will be examined in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. The prediction
submodule must test hypothetical scenarios within a reasonable time so that the latency
does not adversely affect the PLC’s ability to process new commands. A model of the
physical system is simulated and “in sync” with ModOpenPLC in terms of simulated
timing so that when the ladder logic advances a given time step in the simulation, the model
also advances this time step.
When a packet is sent to the PLC that contains a command, EPPIPS uses the
prediction submodule to test the hypothetical scenario of running the command. Because
the packet is a command, the packet has a function code indicating a write request to
EPPIPS. The arrival of the command triggers EPPIPS to predict the potential impact of the
command on the physical system. The EPPIPS performs certain steps when evaluating
write packets. First, the physical system model receives state variable information, such as
the process variable (e.g. current water tank level) from the shadow memory. This process
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variable data is important because the model must have initial conditions similar to the true
physical process's current state, as indicated by the sensor. Second, the command to be
evaluated is applied to ModOpenPLC. Third, the prediction module simulates the physical
system model combined with the ModOpenPLC. Fourth, EPPIPS evaluates the simulation
to determine if any critical variables veer outside of a safe region. A human domain expert
typically defines this safe region in a specification. Fifth, the EPPIPS decides how to
respond depending on the potential impact of running the command. If the command is
determined to be safe according to specific criteria defined later in this chapter, the
command is processed. Otherwise, the EPIPPS module can take other actions, such as
blocking or delaying execution of the packet, to thwart the harmful command. These
actions are described later in the text.

5.2 Operation of the EPPIPS Module
There are two main phases for the operation of the EPPIPS module. These are the training
phase (Phase 1) and deployed phase (Phase 2). The training phase involves training a model
to represent the physical system. The training phase has three major steps: (1) collection,
(2) parameter estimation of the models, and (3) validation and selection of the model. In
the deployed phase, the model will be used to predict if an action will cause the physical
system to enter into an unsafe state. The second phase is the deployed operational phase in
which EPPIPS is actually protecting the PLC in the field. The deployed phase contains two
main steps: (1) monitoring and (2) incident response. The following paragraphs will
describe each of the phases and steps in detail.
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5.2.1 Phase I - Training
In the training phase, EPPIPS (1) collects data and (2) uses the data to estimate parameters
for a trial set of models so that (3) the trial models can be validated with other collected
data to select the best model for EPPIPS.
Step 1 - Collection: This step consists of collecting input and output data over time from
the PLCs. It is assumed that during collection, cyber-attacks have not tampered with this
data. The data can be collected from register values in the PLC. Not all the registers are
needed in this collection except those directly involved in the physical process, such as the
Process Variable (PV) and the Controlled Variable (CV). The amount of data needed
depends on capturing the full range of behavior of the physical system or nearly the full
range in terms of low and high values of the PV.
The input data is defined as input into the physical systems or CV over time. This
input data would also be considered actuator states. The input data may be binary in nature
so that the value can be a 0 or 1. On the other hand, the input may be a range of values if
the actuator can be adjusted to a range of settings, positions, or levels to influence the
physical system. The output data is defined as output from the physical system or the PV
over time. This consists of discrete-time data from the sensors in the physical system. The
time-series data are collected by sampling the sensor data at regular intervals. The
acceptable sample rate depends on the response of the physical system. If the response of
the system is relatively fast, then a higher sampling rate must be used. Otherwise, a lower
sampling rate may be used. There are two main ways that data can be collected. The method
used in this dissertation is to have the control system in the PLC operate using a typical
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program for normal operation of the plant, i.e. a program which plant personnel would use.
As the PLC is running and controlling the plant, the IPS collects the sensor data. The
actuator commands, which are applied to the physical system, are also recorded. The other
approach would be to choose inputs to the physical system directly and experimentally
observe the outputs of the physical system [10]. For example, an actuator, such as a pump
that is used for the physical system, can be activated. The response of the sensor data or
output of the physical system can then be observed as the sensor data rises in value due to
the stimulus of the actuator.
Step 2 - Parameter Estimation: This step involves using the collected time-series data to
train a set of trial mathematical models which are intended to represent the physical system.
The time-series data must capture a wide range of the physical process’s behavior to be
useful for training. Training involves determining parameters for the trial models. The
parameters are part of the mathematical expression of the models and their values
determine the behavior of the models. The behavior refers to how the model’s state and
output behave over time due to stimuli from the input. This work uses the method of least
square error to calculate the parameters [10]. Appendix B gives a thorough explanation of
the method. The method is an approach to system identification. System identification is
the process of taking samples of inputs and output data from the physical system, which is
treated as a black box, and generating models that represent the physical system’s behavior.
One such type of model is an Auto-Regression/Moving Average (ARMA), also referred to
as a linear Auto-Regressive with Exogenous input (ARX) model in some works.
Hadžiosmanović’s work [6] made use of autoregression (AR), as seen in equation 5.1, to
make predictions of what the near future values of the sensor data should be based on past
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trends. In the equation, e is an error term. X[n] is the new calculated value of the process
variable and is based on previous values of the process variable, which are multiplied by
parameters (ai) to determine how previous values of the process variable affect the new
value.

This dissertation extends AR by using ARMA for the model since the model incorporates
both inputs and outputs, not just simply the states or outputs of the physical system as in
the case of Hadžiosmanović’s work[6]. These inputs are essentially actuator signals that
impact the model. The following (Eq. 5.2) is a Single Input and Single Output (SISO)
ARMA model.

An ARMA model may have multiple outputs (X1 …. Xk) and multiple inputs (U0 … Uj)
that affect the physical system. The equation for this Multiple Input Multiple Output
(MIMO) model for i from 1 to k is equation 5.3.

The parameters (a1, a2…,b1,b2), which are coefficients in the equation, must be selected to
enable the model to fit the observed data.
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Step 3 - Validation: This step involves selecting the best structure of the model. In this
context, a structure is a mathematical relationship between the input and output terms in
the form of the ARMA model. Each structure has unique numbers of input terms and output
terms in the right-hand side of the equation for the ARMA model, as seen in Equation 5.2.
In order to choose the correct structure for the model, multiple structures are required to
have been trained in step 2, starting with structures containing a low number of a and b
terms to a higher number of these terms.
Then, other time-series data representing the physical system, besides the data that
was used to train the models, must be applied to the trained trial models. This other data is
the validation data, which consists of input and output time-series data like the training
data. There is no fixed rule on how much validation data to use, but it is generally advisable
to use validation data that captures a wide range of the physical process behavior different
from the training data. Validation data may originate from a larger set of data that includes
the training data. The validation data may also be derived from running an independent set
of experiments on the same physical system used to collect the training data. Whichever
way the validation data is obtained, the input time-series portion of the validation data is
applied to the trial models. The resulting output set of time-series data produced from
applying the input validation data to the trial models may be compared to the output
validation data to determine which trial model is the best fit.
Metrics can be used to determine how well a given trial ARMA model fits the
behaviors of the actual physical system as given by the validation. Mean Absolute
Percentage Error (MAPE) and Symmetric Mean Absolute Percentage Error (SMAPE) are
useful to compare time-series data. Normalized Root Mean squared Error (NRMSE) is also
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used. The purpose of the metrics is for validation to select the best model during the training
and for testing.
Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) is defined by Equation 5.4 where At is
the actual value and Ft is the forecast or predicted value:

Note that in this work, At is a physical value coming from the actual physical system. Ft is
the corresponding value coming from the ARMA model. The variable n is the number of
samples taken over time for the time series. The MAPE metric has limitations when
samples for At are close to zero and when there is a substantial difference between At and
Ft. The result of dividing the numerator in the equation by At when At is close to zero skews
the overall value for MAPE.
The Symmetric Mean Absolute Percentage Error (SMAPE) addresses the problem
of division by a number close to zero, which skews the results from MAPE. SMAPE is
calculated in Equation 5.5, where A is the actual value, and F is the forecast value.

SMAPE takes the average of the actual and the forecast value for the denominator. The
smaller the resulting value for SMAPE, the more accurate the ARMA model is.
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Another fit function for comparison of time-series data called Normalized Root
NRMSE is seen in Equation 5.6:

In this equation, A and F are vectors for the actual time series data and the forecasted time
series data respectively. The ||...|| notation means the 2-norm or Euclidean distance.
Normalized Root Mean Squared Error (NRMSE) is the primary metric used to
determine how well the models fit the validation data. The other metrics are also used for
comparison and for a later evaluation in this dissertation. The purpose of the validation is
to prevent underfitting or overfitting the data. Underfitting occurs when the model is not
accurate enough to represent the physical system as indicated by the metric. Overfitting
occurs when a given trained model structure seems to accurately represent a given set of
data from the physical system, but the model is not general enough to represent other data
from the physical system. In this case the model is overly complex and uses more
parameters than is necessary to fit the data. When the model is validated with another set
of data, the model structure has a low value for the NRMSE. When multiple structures are
validated with the same data, the model that has the highest value according to NMRSE is
least affected by overfitting. The step of validation determines the trial model that best
avoids underfitting and overfitting. This model is the most representative of the physical
system.
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5.2.2 Phase II - Deployed Operation
Once the training phase has generated a model for the physical system, the prediction
module of EPPIPS can use the model for a deployed operation when the EPPIPS is actually
protecting an ICS. EPPIPS examines incoming packets and uses the model to predict the
impacts of the packet’s payload. The deployed phase involves (1) monitoring and
inspection of incoming packets and (2) responding to packets determined to cause safety
violations, especially safety violations that are imminent.
Step 1 – Monitoring and Evaluation of Incoming Packets: This step involves using the
ARMA model to evaluate incoming command packets and ladder logic uploads. The
evaluation involves simulating the scenario in which the command is processed. The goal
of running a scenario is to detect if the change would be harmful to the physical system
according to defined safety criteria, which are part of the specification contained within
EPPIPS.
The evaluation approach is as follows: When the PLC receives one of the packets,
the EPPIPS evaluates the packet with its prediction submodule. The prediction submodule
uses the trained ARMA model to predict whether the command, if applied to
ModOpenPLC to affect the model, would violate the safety conditions for the system. This
prediction submodule contains a copy of the compiled ladder logic code in the
ModOpenPLC process. The ModOpenPLC process interfaces with the model inputs and
outputs. Essentially, the model and the ladder logic copy in ModOpenPLC will be run
concurrently, or in other words, in step with each other. The model will be allowed to
advance one ladder logic scan cycle period. Then the ladder logic advances a scan cycle.
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The specification contains (1) the model of the physical system, which is an ARMA
model described previously with its various parameters; (2) safety conditions for the
process variable controlled by the PLC, which must be maintained; and (3) conditions for
imminent danger, which involves the timing of an arriving command’s harmful impact.
The safety condition must be described as an acceptable range with minimum (PVmin) and
maximum (PVmax) values. The process variable must remain in that range to be considered
safe (PVmin <= PV <= PVmax). For EPPIPS’s prediction capability, the EPPIPS makes a
determination on whether the given program or setting will cause the physical process to
become unsafe within a given prediction window. The prediction window is the set of scan
cycles that are run dynamically in the prediction module to predict future behavior. Another
way to characterize safety is the idea of imminent danger in which a minimum time value
is given in addition to the safety condition. In other words, there is imminent danger if the
predicted unsafe event at te occurs before the minimum time (tmin): PV > PVmax or PV <
PVmin, where te < tmin. The minimum time is defined in a specification file from the user.
Step 2 - Incident Response: Possible actions that the EPPIPS takes when responding to
packets determined to cause a safety violation include the following: (1) Process packet or
load ladder logic, (2) Drop packet, (3) Delay the processing of the packet or the loading of
the new ladder logic. Delaying the packet means that it will not be processed for a given
amount of time as stated by the specification. This allows the user to decide whether to
proceed with processing the packet. All of these cases will include alerting the user. The
decision on how EPPIPS responds is a heuristic process based on the predicted severity of
the cyber-attacks. If a packet arrives at the PLC, and EPPIPS determines the packet to have
a benign effect on the physical system, meaning the resulting behavior of the ICS would
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be safe and not imminently dangerous, then the packet is processed. If the resulting
behavior is predicted within the prediction window to eventually become unsafe but does
not cause imminent danger (te <= tmin), then the packet is processed with an alert to the
user. If however, the packet is predicted to cause imminent danger, then, the packet is
dropped or delayed. The specification indicates the choice of whether to drop or delay.
For this deployed phase, a packet’s arrival triggers EPPIPS prediction module.
However, there are other times when EPPIPS can be triggered. Three conditions trigger
model execution: (1) When EPPIPS starts intercepting communication between the PLC
and HMI (2) When payload arrives, and (3) Periodically. In the first case, once the PLC
starts running, and information regarding the current state of the PLC enters the EPPIPS’s
shadow memory, EPIPPS starts the prediction submodule. The second case is the primary
case of evaluating a new command packet that EPPIPS responds to. The third case occurs
periodically to account for the fact the prediction window of EPPIPS is limited.
5.3 Other Protection Devices in Tandem with EPPIPS
As EPPIPS runs in its deployed operation, another device, a Safety Instrumented System
(SIS), is typically used for safety purposes in many ICSs. SISs are systems whose purpose
is to monitor the behavior of the physical process/system under the control of the PLC. A
SIS acts to place the physical process into a safe state when the physical process enters into
or closely approaches an unsafe state. In this context, the state is a process variable of the
physical system such as temperature or pressure which may be at a dangerous level. The
SIS is independent of the PLC and may have actuators and sensors separate from the PLC’s
actuators and sensors [28]. EPPIPS is not the same as an SIS, although both deal with
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unsafe conditions. EPPIPS can predict what an incoming packet with a given payload will
do to the physical system. The arrival of the payload is a cyber event that EPPIPS can
identify, respond to, and log. Being able to attribute a given packet to a predicted unsafe
condition is useful for performing forensics on the SCADA system. On the other hand, the
SIS responds to a situation where the process variable is about to become unsafe by taking
actions through its own actuators to alleviate the situation. The SIS responds regardless of
whether the unsafe situation is caused by a cyber event or a physical fault. A fault may
happen when a valve or pump becomes unresponsive in a given physical system. To
understand the SIS and its bearing on cybersecurity, it is helpful to understand how the SIS
is used in various applications and how cyber-attacks can affect the SIS.
There are several examples of SIS systems used in various infrastructure. In a
dramatic example, a nuclear power plant has safety equipment to shut down the reactor if
predefined safety conditions are violated (i.e. the reactor’s temperature rises to a very high
level). Such equipment serves a vital function since the equipment prevents a potential
meltdown. On the other hand, when such an event occurs, the plant cannot produce power.
The lack of power production capability is not desirable but is better than the worst
possibility of a meltdown. Another example is a generator system. Commercial generators
are designed to shut down if a fault occurs. A fault is defined as an event that goes out of
safety conditions. The safety equipment of the generator is not necessarily independent of
the digital control system in the generator but is a useful example.
Although the SIS may ensure that the physical process can be brought to a safe state
when approaching an unsafe state, cyber-attacks may still have adverse effects on the ICS
despite the use of an SIS. The act of an SIS system responding to impending safety
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concerns places the ICS essentially out of commission from operating as designed. An
attacker may wish to take advantage of the disabled operation to sabotage the industrial
control system. In this case, sabotage means that the SCADA system or ICS cannot perform
useful work since the SIS effectively shuts down the ICS. The attacker can perform the
sabotage by sending commands or uploading new ladder logic to drive the physical system
toward the unsafe state to manipulate the SIS to act. In the case that a SIS exists but EPPIPS
is not present in an ICS while a cyber-attack induces an unsafe condition, the SIS will act
to place the system into a safe state as the SIS was designed to. However, once this has
occurred, plant personnel may try to reset and restart the ICS when in fact, the ICS is still
compromised. Furthermore, since the SIS is likely to be a PLC just like the controller for
the physical process, the SIS is not immune from being hacked itself in the same ways as
the controller. However, the SIS is usually physically isolated from the main ICS network,
reducing the SIS’s attack surface.
In summary, both the EPPIPS and the SIS are useful devices that manage safety
concerns. These devices have similarities and differences. EPPIPS is equipped to identify
and respond to cyber-events that trigger physical-events. On the other hand, an SIS can
ultimately handle safety concerns, but cyber-attacks can potentially manipulate the SIS.
The SIS as an embedded system is not immune to cyber-attacks in general. Together, both
devices may be used to improve the overall safety and security of the ICS. Table 5.1 below
highlights the major characteristics of the two devices in terms of safety and cybersecurity.
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Table 5.1: Comparison of Major Characteristics of EPPIPS and SIS in Terms of
Safety and Cybersecurity

EPPIPS

SIS

EPPIPS identifies and responds to cyber events SIS identifies and responds to physical events
(i.e. arrival of packet) predicted to cause safety affecting safety regardless of their cause.
concerns

EPPIPS can attribute a cyber event’s potential SIS cannot attribute a cyber event’s potential
physical impact to the cyber event.
physical impact to the cyber event.

EPPIPS can respond to a cyber event before it SIS can only respond to a cyber event after the
has an impact by blocking, delaying or event has a physical impact by shutting down
warning.
the ICS. This means a cyber-attack can
sabotage the ICS.

EPPIPS can protect the ICS from safety SIS is useful to prevent physical destruction,
concerns related to cyber threats, but EPPIPS even if a cyber-attack can take advantage of an
is best augmented with an SIS.
SIS in other ways.

5.4 Actual Design and Placement of EPPIPS
The EPPIPS module’s implementation is an embedded IDS similar to the “on the edge”
approach by Das et al. [47]. EPPIPS is essentially a process in the PLC’s hardware that
exists as a proxy between the main OpenPLC Process controlling the physical process and
the network. For this work, the placement of the EPPIPS is implemented in either a virtual
machine or a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+, a low-cost commodity embedded system. The Pi
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3 Model B+ has four cores each running at 1.4GHz. The virtual machine and Raspberry Pi
serve as the hardware of the PLC. Figure 5.3 depicts the placement and implementation as
used in this work.
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Figure 5.3: Main Placement and Actual Implementation of EPPIPS
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The physical placement of EPPIPS module may also be in the HMI of the SCADA
system, a centralized placement. Figure 5.2 below depicts two possible placements of the
EPPIPS: (a) EPPIPS as a process in a PLC, (b) EPPIPS in the HMI or central computer.

Figure 5.4: Standard and Alternative Placements of EPPIPS

The PLC placement is evaluated in this work. The advantage of the PLC placement
is that EPPIPS is not susceptible to DoS attacks on the network, meaning that EPPIPS
would still be able to function in updating its memory map. If EPPIPS uses the
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HMI/Central Computer placement, then DoS attacks occurring on the network can affect
the situational awareness of EPPIPS. An adversary, acting as a foreign node on the
network, can also inject commands to the PLC that may not be observed with the second
placement. The rationale for using EPPIPS in the HMI for second placement is to serve as
an access control to users and processes in the HMI. The access control evaluates the
commands or malicious ladder logic inducing an unsafe state and flags those that are
harmful.
5.5 Hypotheses to be Evaluated
A set of hypotheses were formulated for EPPIPS and must be evaluated through
experimentation. The first hypothesis is foundational in that the hypothesis deals with the
threat model that EPPIPS addresses. The remaining hypotheses are design requirements
for EPPIPS. Experimentation must show that these requirements are met. The hypotheses
are as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Given an industrial control system as described in Chapter 3 with a network
and multiple nodes that include a PLC controlling a physical process, a threat model exists
that can harm the physical process. The threat model consists of commands sent to change
settings in the PLC and malicious ladder logic.
Hypothesis 2: Using system identification and machine learning techniques, ARMA
models of the physical system or process can be generated so that EPPIPS can predict the
effects of an action by the PLC before the action occurs. To test this hypothesis,
experiments will be conducted with various attacks that include command injection on the
physical system while recording the input and output data. In these experiments, a model
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that has previously been generated based on steps 1 – 3 of the training phase will predict
the behavior of the physical system due to the attacks. A comparison will be made between
the two - how the attack actually impacted the true physical process versus how the EPPIPS
module predicted the attack would impact the physical system. The comparison is
evaluated based on specific criteria, which are metrics described in the next section.
Hypothesis 3: Using an ARMA model of the physical system, EPPIPS can determine
whether a command to alter settings in a PLC is harmful within reasonable real-time
requirements. These real-time requirements may be defined according to specific criterion,
which is to determine if the latency of the prediction occurs in less than the actual PLC
scan cycle time. If the latency for prediction does not exceed the scan cycle time, then the
latency would be reasonable for real-time considerations.
Hypothesis 4: The techniques used in this work can detect threats that appear in every way
as normal but contain a malicious payload in the packet delivered to the PLC. Normal
packets are legitimately constructed with a valid format and have inter-arrival time, packet
size, and other network characteristics that fit a normal profile of SCADA network traffic.
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CHAPTER 6.

EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND TESTBEDS

Evaluating the hypotheses concerning the threat model and EPPIPS required the
development of a general experimental setup, specific testbeds, and experiments. It was
necessary to take the industrial control system (ICS) concepts discussed in Chapter 3 and
elsewhere in this dissertation, and employ the testbeds, which are working implementations
of ICSs. The testbeds include a generator system, a pipeline with variable speed pump
(VSP), storage tank with VSP, and an HVAC system. Each testbed incorporates a physical
system modeled in MATLAB Simulink, one or more programmable logic controllers
(PLCs), a virtual network for the ICS network, and an HMI. The experimental setup uses
virtual machines (VMs) on the network to represent the PLC, the HMI, and a malicious
rogue device for each testbed in accordance with the modular virtual framework by Alves
et al [17]. The overall setup also includes a Safety-Instrumented System (SIS) as a VM not
connected to the main network to evaluate the ICS’s response to cyber-attacks that impact
safety.
The experiments performed were representative of the scenarios that the ICS
testbeds can experience. The experiments include normal operations and various attack
scenarios involving injection and point-scan reconnaissance to test EPPIPS. An automation
script was developed to run the experiments more efficiently and to generate realistic
randomized stimulus for the experiments.
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6.1 The Setup and Virtual Framework
Performing experiments involves virtual testbeds to represent ICS. Therefore, this
dissertation uses the framework for an ICS fully explained in Alves’s work [17]. The
framework divides an ICS logically into five components. The five components as seen in
Figure 6.1 are (1) the physical system, (2) the cyber-physical link, (3) the PLC, (4) the
network, and (5) the HMI (remote monitoring and control). A hypervisor runs virtual
machines representing the HMI and PLC, which make up the nodes of the ICS network.
What follows are descriptions of each component and how each component is adapted or
adjusted in this dissertation’s setup. The rogue device and SIS were also implemented and
used.

Figure 6.1: Illustration of Setup for Experiments
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6.1.1 The Physical System
The physical system is the first component of the ICS architecture and consists of
a physical process such as power generation, oil & gas production, hydraulics,
transportation, or thermodynamics of a building. The physical process on a SCADA system
has sensors and actuators to monitor and control the process variables. A sensor is a device
that measures a physical quantity such as pressure, temperature, flow, or density, and
converts it into an electric signal, which can be read by an observer or by an instrument.
An actuator is a component of a machine that is responsible for moving or controlling a
mechanism in the physical system, given an input signal. The actuator is the mechanism
by which a control system can act upon the environment
MATLAB Simulink provides a useful representation of the physics that must be
modeled for the physical system. Simulink runs on the host machine of the experimental
setup, as depicted in Figure 6.1, and is the simulator for the physical system. MATLAB
was selected because of its ubiquitous use in research and engineering applications.

6.1.2 The Cyber-Physical Link
The cyber-physical link facilitates communication between the physical system and
the virtual machine (VM) in which OpenPLC Runtime executes. This link transfers UDP
packets representing sensor data and actuator signals between the simulator and the
SimLink program, which is also known as the PLC Interface program in the PLC VM. The
link uses a host-only network for communication. The link does not represent a network
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but instead serves as the “wires” between the PLC and the sensors and actuators. The work
by Alves et al [17] describes the specifics of how data is routed to and from specific sensors
and actuators. The cyber-physical link is illustrated as bidirectional arrows between the
physical system and the PLC in Figure 6.1. Another instance of the link is between the
physical system and the SIS.

6.1.3 The PLC
A software version of the OpenPLC runtime is executed in a VM (Figure 6.1) to represent
a hardware PLC. The PLC’s OpenPLC runtime is the main PLC process for regulating the
physical system according to the PLC’s internal ladder logic program. The main PLC
process determines the behavior of the actuators and receives the sensor data.
Along with the main PLC process, the specific setup places the EPPIPS module
inside the PLC. EPPIPS exists as a proxy process between the main PLC process and the
network. All Modbus traffic sent to the PLC VM is routed to the EPPIPS proxy process
since EPPIPS listens to TCP port 502, which is the IANA assigned port number for the
Modbus protocol. EPPIPS analyzes all incoming Modbus packets. EPPIPS can pass the
packets to a localhost port that the main PLC process is listening to. This happens when
EPPIPS deems that the packet is acceptable to allow the main PLC program to process.
EPPIPS is also listening to port 8080 to analyze incoming ladder logic upload requests.
The PLC in this work uses two network adaptors in the OpenPLC virtual machine. One
adapter is for the cyber-physical link as described previously so that the PLC can interface
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with the physical system through the actuators and sensors, and the other is for connecting
to the main network of the virtual framework.

6.1.4 The Network
To represent the ICS network, the research utilized a virtual network. Oracle Virtual Box,
the hypervisor for this work, allows for creating this virtual network (Network illustration
seen in Figure 6.1 connecting the VMs). The purpose of the network is to enable
communication between major nodes that include the PLC and HMI, which communicate
using the Modbus TCP/IP protocol. Modbus allows for requests for information from one
node to another to query PLC registers and coils. Modbus also allows for commands to be
sent to change the registers and coils. Both the queries and commands are important in this
work and are monitored by EPPIPS in the PLC.
All the nodes in the network including the HMI and the PLC possess IP addresses.
The IP addresses are assigned statically since the nodes of a typical ICS network are
typically fixed in number and are not generally removed and added as often as in general
IT networks. Other nodes can be considered as adversaries and are also VMs on the
network. It is assumed in this work that the adversary has access to the network. Therefore,
the network is considered the main attack surface of interest to affect the nodes in this
dissertation.
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6.1.5 The HMI
The Human Machine Interface (HMI) is implemented as a SCADABR web application on
its own VM connected to the virtual network (Figure 6.1). SCADABR is a useful program
since the program behaves as a typical HMI that sends request packets to the PLC at regular
intervals and receives the resulting response packets from the PLC to update the user on
the current status of the overall ICS. This status includes many of the registers
corresponding to specific sensors and actuators and relevant states. SCADABR provides a
user-friendly graphical user interface (GUI) for the HMI. Pymodbus-based scripts are also
used to emulate the behavior of the HMI as if a user were controlling the HMI. Note that
for some of the attack scenarios, there are rogue programs that exist on the HMI VM to
control the HMI as if the HMI has been compromised.

6.1.6 Other Settings and Adaptations for the Setup
This experimental setup requires specific settings for the timing of simulations and also
needs other devices, such as realistic PLC hardware and SIS. The first requirement involves
synchronization of clocks in both OpenPLC and Matlab Simulink. Another requirement is
to use an embedded system to represent the PLC in latency tests and a virtual machine to
represent the SIS. The SIS is used for experiments with the ICS involving unsafe
commands.
Because synchronization is required, the virtualized OpenPLC and the simulator
are treated as co-simulators that must be coordinated so that they can accurately represent
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a real engineering system. To achieve synchronization, simulation pacing options in
MATLAB are set so that the simulation speed corresponds with the wall clock.
Specifically, one second will elapse in the simulation as one second elapses in the real
world. Timing is very important for complex ladder logic, such as the ladder logic of PID
and PI controllers used for this dissertation. PID and PI controllers have parameters tuned
for specific physical processes that they regulate. Timing is also important for simpler
ladder logic that implements manual mode or hysteresis mode. For example, suppose the
PLC’s ladder logic directs the actuator, such as a pump, to turn on. The actuator would
drive the process variable (PV) of the simulated physical system to change at a certain rate.
If the Simulink model incorrectly speeds up suddenly and the scan cycle of the PLC
remains constant, then as the ladder logic reads input during its next scan cycle, the PV
will appear to be increasing at a faster rate than before. Because of these concerns, If the
simulator representing the behavior of the physical process is chaotic in pace when
updating the behavior, the simulation generates irreproducible results and poor
experimental data. The simulator would not represent the real world. Furthermore, if the
simulator does not represent the real world, the prediction submodule of EPPIPS or any
other independent simulation software would not be able to forecast future behavior of the
simulator.
In addition to the virtual machine used for the PLC, a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+
serves as the PLC hardware for a set of experiments to accurately measure the latency of
EPPIPS. The Raspberry Pi is necessary to represent an embedded system, which has
limited resources as compared to a virtual machine running on a modern general-purpose
computer. All other components of the testbed remained the same for the testbed.
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To implement the threat model of this work as described in Chapter 3, it is necessary
to have another virtual machine on the network dedicated as the threat actor since it is
assumed that the adversary is on the network in this work. This other virtual machine,
referred to as a rogue device in this work, has tools on it that allow it to perform the attacks.
The setup has another PLC that can interface with sensors and actuators in the
Simulink model but is not connected to the main network. This other PLC serves as the
SIS.as depicted in Figure 6.1. Figure 6.1 illustrates the setup that was used for the
experiments of this work. The figure shows the PLC, the rogue VM representing the
adversary, and the HMI are all connected to the virtual network of the hypervisor. The
hypervisor and Simulink are both running on the host machine as depicted by grey and
orange rectangles respectively within the larger rectangle representing the host.

6.2 Specific Testbeds
This section describes specific and distinctive testbeds constructed based on the previously
described framework of Alves et al [17]. The purpose of the testbeds is to cover several
domains of engineering and to support testing to evaluate the hypotheses. These testbeds
allow for experiments with EPPIPS. All testbeds used in this dissertation research are
virtual testbeds. The testbeds include (1) a generator system’s diesel engine, (2) a pipeline
with a variable-speed pump, (3) a water storage tank also with a variable-speed pump, and
(4) a heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system. The testbeds have models
of physical systems constructed either using well-established first principles or components
designed by engineers and researchers for simulations. For each testbed discussed in this
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section, an overview is given followed by a description of the testbed's main and
distinguishing features that include (1) the physical system and (2) the control system
ladder logic.
6.2.1 The Generator System
The diesel generator has been a significant subject of discussion in cybersecurity research
for more than a decade. For example, in 2007, researchers at Idaho National Laboratory
performed experiments in which a diesel generator was connected and disconnected to an
electric grid using circuit breakers. The system’s synchronization check relays were
disabled for the experiment. The repeated connect and disconnect behavior caused a lack
of voltage waveform synchronization between the electric grid and the generator, which
physically damaged the generator [27]. This experiment brought to light that generators are
vulnerable to cyber-attacks that can be physically destructive. To understand the potential
for attacks against a generator, the researcher is aided by having a basic understanding of
a generator’s operation. A generator essentially converts mechanical power to electrical
power using a synchronous machine. For an Alternating Current (AC) generator, the output
waveform frequency for the electricity generated is directly related to how fast the electric
motor’s shaft is rotating. A governor regulates the engine’s speed to rotate the shaft at a
constant or nearly constant speed to produce a desired stable frequency. The governor
consists of a control system and uses an actuator. The actuator of this control system is a
fuel injector. Injecting more fuel causes the engine to increase the speed of the rotating
shaft. This should occur if the engine is rotating too slowly and is therefore not at the
desired speed for the desired frequency. Injecting less fuel decreases the speed. The
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governor of the generator regulates the fuel injection actuator to maintain a desired speed
for the engine.
Diesel generator applications vary. They are used as backup power sources in
nuclear power plants [42], hospitals, and commercial and residential buildings. Diesel
generators are often found in remote locations where power is needed away from the
electric grid, such as military applications, mining, and marine applications. Diesel
generators are also used as power sources in microgrids.
6.2.1.1 Generator - Physical System
The generator testbed's physical system model consists of a MATLAB Simulink model
that simulates the basic operation of the electromechanical aspects of the generator. The
generator’s physical system includes a synchronous machine and a diesel engine. This
model is based on an example generator model designed by Yaeger and Willis and
provided in the MATLAB software [57]. The model in [57] was rated at 2,400 volts lineto-line and 3.25 MVA (megavolt amps). These characteristics remained unchanged for the
purposes of this testbed. The example was modified to include sensors to measure RPM
(revolutions per minute), oil pressure, fuel level, and temperature for the engine as well as
the output power frequency, VRMS (voltage root mean square), and IRMS (current root mean
square). The generator in this work is connected to a simple load that is a motor for running
pumps. A fuel tank model was also added as a subsystem to represent the fuel as if it were
in a storage tank similar to the case study described in [17]. The storage tank is assumed to
be able to hold a volume of liquid, and liquid can be added to the tank at a given volumetric
flow rate (Q_in) and leave the tank at another volumetric flow rate (Q_out). Volumetric
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flow rate is expressed as unit volume per unit time, such as gal/hr. In the case of the fuel
tank, Qin is set to 0, and the Qout is assumed to be 1.04gal/hr, which is the average fuel rate
of consumption for the generator when it is on. Therefore, fuel is leaving the tank as the
engine consumes fuel, and the volume of fuel in the tank diminishes over time. It is also
assumed that there is an initial amount of 20 gallons of fuel when the generator is first
switched on. The original generator model used a continuous-time control system to model
the governor. For this work, the continuous-time governor control system was converted
to a discrete-time version implemented in ladder logic and run on an OpenPLC.
6.2.1.2 Generator - Control System Ladder Logic
The Ladder Logic for the generator has two main functions: (1) regulating the engine shaft
speed to ensure the correct resulting output frequency that corresponds to the selected
reference frequency and (2) validating sensor data. The focus of this dissertation is on the
first function. The portion of the ladder logic that is relevant is seen in Figure 6.2. Note that
the full ladder logic may be seen in Appendix A.

Figure 6.2 Portion of the Generator Ladder Logic for Regulation
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In the ladder logic, there are two main blocks. The top block allows a Boolean variable to
select which value from two choices to pass as the reference, which in this case is the
desired frequency for the generator. These values correspond to 60Hz and 50Hz. The
bottom block serves as the controller, written in ST (Structured Text) code. ST is a highlevel programming language that is part of the IEC-61131-3 standard. The code contains
an algorithm that implements the digital controller for regulating the speed of the engine.
This block takes the angular velocity (omega in the ladder logic) of the engine and the
reference angular velocity as input. The input to the block also includes a gain parameter,
which is a major setting that affects the behavior of the controller. The controller uses a
transfer function to determine whether to increase, decrease, or maintain the rate to inject
fuel into the engine. This result is output as the variable act_com in Figure 6.2. This bottom
block is functionally equivalent to the portion of diagram in the dashed box in Figure 6.3:

Figure 6.3: Block Diagram of Controller Implemented in DCS
Wref (a variable that corresponds with “Reference” in the ladder logic) represents the
reference, or the desired angular velocity of the engine shaft, while W (a variable that
corresponds with Omega in the ladder logic) represents the current angular velocity. W is
read by a sensor and passed through a zero-order hold, which converts the resulting value
from a continuous-time value to a discrete one. Within the portion of the governor
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implemented in the DCS, as seen in the dashed area of Figure 6.3, the current angular
velocity, which is given from sampled sensor readings, is subtracted from the reference
angular velocity to determine the error. The resulting value is then passed through a discrete
transfer function represented as a block within the dashed area. The transfer function uses
Equation 6.1:

The output of that function is multiplied by the gain, an adjustable parameter stored in a
register within the DCS. The output of the gain is transmitted to the physical model and
passed through the actuator block to produce the torque value, which is multiplied by W,
the angular velocity. The product of this multiplication is Pm, the mechanical power, which
is used by the Simulink model to determine the electrical output of the engine. Yeager’s
work [57] describes a continuous-time transfer function for this governor, which was
discretized so that the transfer function can be implemented on the DCS. Because the DCS
is a digital system, the DCS has a sampling period. Essentially, an input to the system is
sampled at a period determined appropriate by the designer of the system. Updates to
internal state variables and outputs, which may be partially determined by the inputs, are
performed at the sampling period. If a higher sampling rate is selected, then the digital
transfer function will behave more accurately, like its continuous-time counterpart.
Parameters of the transfer function were determined for a digital system with a sampling
period of 20ms. Continuous-discrete conversion approaches, such as the Zero-order hold
method, can be applied to convert a continuous transfer function to a discrete transfer
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function at a given sampling period. MATLAB provides commands that can carry out this
operation [59].
6.2.2 Pipeline with Variable-Speed Pump
A model of a pipeline based on the works [52], [6] was used and modified to include a
variable-speed pump. The original version of the MATLAB Simulink model for the
pipeline was in turn based on an actual pipeline testbed in the University in Alabama in
Huntsville (UAH)’s SCADA Laboratory. The actual testbed consisted of a ¾-inch diameter
steel pipeline. The testbed also incorporates a pump as the actuator. The pump takes air
from the surrounding environment to cause pressure to build up in the pipeline. The testbed
also has a pressure sensor and a valve to allow for the release of air.

6.2.2.1 Pipeline - Physical System
Due to the complex dynamics of this system, intricate modeling and simulation software
was utilized. MATLAB Simulink provides the SimHydraulics Simscape toolbox that is
suitable for this pipeline. Note that the toolbox did not model compressed air, but the
toolbox could be used to model the physical system so that the physical system’s behavior
was similar to the behavior as seen in the actual laboratory testbed. Figure 6.4 below depicts
the Simulink Model. The main portion of the original Simulink model exists in the
subsystem labeled “SCADA LAB Gas Pipeline with Variable Speed Pump.” In the
subsystem labeled “Virtual PLC” are UDP send and receive blocks to allow the OpenPLC
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on a Virtual Machine using the PLC interface program to interface with the Simulink model
of the physical system. The HMI used for the testbed has an image that illustrates the pipe’s
physical configuration, as seen in Figure 6.5.

Figure 6.4: Simulink Model

Figure 6.5: HMI Image Illustrating the Physical Configuration of Pipeline
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The testbed for the pipeline with variable-speed pump, modified from the testbed with the
fixed-speed pump, includes a variable-pump speed setting ranging from 0 to 100%.
Whereas the fixed speed pump has only two discrete states for the actuator: “on” or “off.”
The variable-speed pump’s highest setting corresponds to the original pump’s “on” state.
The advantage of a variable-speed pump is greater control of the process so that the process
variable can approach the setpoint more smoothly. PID and PI controllers regulate such
variable actuators.
6.2.2.2 Pipeline - Control System
The ladder logic developed for the variable speed pump pipeline has three main modes: (1)
Manual, (2) Hysteresis Control, and (3) PI Control. Appendix A contains a full description
of the ladder logic. The Ladder Logic uses a register called mode_register to store the
current mode as an integer. The ladder logic is partitioned into several major sections, some
of which are responsible for carrying out the functions of the modes. The first section is
for converting the raw pressure reading to PSI, which is more useful and relatable for a
designer of the ladder logic. The second section implements the manual mode. The manual
mode allows a user to turn the pump on or off and also to select the pump's speed when the
pump is on. The third section is for the hysteresis control, the theory of which is explained
in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. A hysteresis controller maintains the process variable
between two set points. The hysteresis control mode allows a user to select the pump’s
speed when the pump is on. The last section of the ladder logic is dedicated to the
proportional/integral (PI) controller. The PI controller is implemented using a structured
text (ST) block in the ladder logic diagram. Note that there are adjustable registers for the
proportional and integral gains to tune the PI controller. The outputs of the main sections
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for the three modes are multiplexed to the final output for the actuator, which in this case
is the variable-speed pump. The value of the mode_register determines which section has
control of the actuator.
6.2.3 Storage Tank
The storage tank illustrated in Figure 6.6 may be used as a water tower in a city. The storage
tank is implemented as a testbed in this work and uses a pump to fill the tank and a valve
to drain the tank. The pump is an actuator. The PLC ladder logic determines whether the
pump is on or off. A sensor monitors the liquid level of the tank by measuring its pressure.
The sensor data goes to the PLC.

Figure 6.6: Illustration of Water Tank

6.2.3.1 Storage Tank - Physical System
For this specific testbed, two versions of the physical system were implemented: (1) a
version based on balance equations relating the rate of accumulated liquid in the tank with
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the rate of liquid entering and leaving the tank and (2) a version made using the MATLAB
Simulink SimHydraulics toolbox.
6.2.3.1.1 Storage Tank from First Principles. For the first version, the physical dynamics
of the system can be modeled with the following equation where V is the volume of water
in the tank, Qin is the volumetric inflow, which is controlled in this work by the pump. Qout
is the outflow and is controlled by the valve:

Given that V = Ah, where A is the cross-sectional area of the cylindrical tank and h is the
height of the water level, the equation above is manipulated to the following form:

For a small tank, it is possible to assume that the outflow of water is nearly constant, which
means that the system behaves with a linear response. However, this assumption does not
hold for larger tanks. The following is a common form used in this dissertation, where the
outflow (Qout) is a function of the height when the valve is open:

One of the reasons that this version of the storage tank was created is to observe the
nonlinear form that Eq. 6.4 exhibits, which affects the behavior of the physical system. The

108

physical system based on first principles gives an understanding of the water tank’s
behavior. The next version is the main one used in experiments.
6.2.2.1.2 Storage Tank Made with Simhydraulics
The storage tank implemented using SimHydraulics is based on the actual testbed in
UAH’s SCADA Laboratory as seen in Figure 6.7. The SimHydraulics storage tank uses an
inflow rate for pump equal to the flow rate of the actual testbed counterpart in the lab as
determined through experimentation. The size of the tank is modeled to be the same as
measurements taken in the laboratory.

Figure 6.7: SimHydraulics Physical System
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6.2.3.2 Storage Tank - Control System
The ladder logic used for the storage tank model is the same as the pipeline’s ladder logic
with the three modes and variable-speed control. Minor changes were made in the ladder
logic to include using an altered formula to convert raw water level data to a humanreadable value, which is the water level expressed as a percentage of span. Percentage of
span commonly represents values for physical quantities and is expressed as a range from
0%, indicating a minimum or lowest acceptable value, to 100%, indicating a maximum or
highest acceptable value. Percentage of span is an alternative to other ways of representing
values, such as using standard units of physical quantities that include Bars for pressure or
meters for height or water level [3].
6.2.4 HVAC
A HVAC system was modeled for this work. Nearly all businesses and residential areas
use HVAC systems to keep a building’s interior temperature at a level reasonable for
occupants. A “smart home” would most likely have an HVAC controller networked with
a centralized computer system or server. HVAC systems are generally controlled using a
hysteresis controller. HVAC controllers have a temperature setpoint and a hysteresis value.
When in cooling mode, the A/C turns on at the setpoint and turns off at the setpoint minus
the hysteresis value. When heating in heating mode, the heater turns on at the setpoint
minus the hysteresis value and turns off at the setpoint.
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6.2.4.1 HVAC - Physical System
Newton’s laws of heating and cooling govern HVAC systems. In this work, a model of the
physical system (Figure 6.8) was developed in MATLAB using mathematics described in
Mendes et al. [54] and from an example in MATLAB Simulink [55].

6.8 HVAC: Simulink Model
6.2.4.2 HVAC – Control System
This chapter provides a high-level explanation of the ladder logic of the HVAC system. A
more detailed technical description and a diagram can be found in Appendix A. To aid in
this discussion of the ladder logic for this testbed, the ladder logic is divided into several
sections. Like the pipeline and storage ladder logic, the HVAC ladder logic uses a register
to store the mode on how the PLC is to operate. The user selects the mode to determine
which ladder logic section controls the PLC’s output or actuators. These sections are (1)
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Off Mode, (2) Manual Mode, (3) Auto Mode - Heat, (4) Auto Mode - Cool, (5) Output. If
Off mode (Mode = 1) is selected, the PLC will turn off the heating and cooling actuators.
If Manual mode is selected, (Mode = 2), the user can control heating and cooling actuators
through direct settings. The next two sections (Auto Mode - Heat and Auto Mode - Cool)
are for hysteresis control of the HVAC. Auto Mode - Heat (Mode = 3) regulates the
temperature with the heating system and is a mode intended for when the external
temperature tends to drive the building's internal temperature to a colder temperature. On
the other hand, Auto Mode - Cool (Mode = 4) regulates the temperature with the cooling
system and is intended for countering external heat that drives the temperature high in the
building. The output section of the ladder logic is for multiplexing which section’s output
is ultimately the output of the PLC to control the actuators.
6.3 Experiments
The experiments performed with the testbeds are crucial to test the hypotheses introduced
in Chapter 5 concerning the relevant cyber-attacks and EPPIPS. Specific Experiments must
be performed for the hypotheses and are described in the following paragraphs.
Hypothesis 1 (Hyp. 1) supposes that a threat model can affect the physical process
regulated by an ICS to cause the process to enter into an unsafe state. To demonstrate the
validity of Hyp. 1, experiments must be performed with cyber-attacks in the threat model
described in Chapter 3 to influence the physical system. The purpose of the experiments is
to determine if the threat model can cause safety concerns. This first hypothesis is
foundational to the remaining hypotheses, which are themselves requirements for EPPIPS.
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If the first hypothesis is true, then an IPS must be created to detect these attacks and even
respond to them.
According to Hypothesis 2 (Hyp. 2), ARMA models can be generated for EPPIPS
to make an accurate prediction for the payloads of incoming packets. Hyp. 2 requires the
researcher to carry out the training phase steps explained in Chapter 5 and then experiment
with attacks against the EPPIPS. EPPIPS makes predictions of what will occur due to an
incoming payload. To evaluate the accuracy of the prediction for Hyp. 2, the prediction
must be compared using the metrics for time-series data defined in Chapter 5. The other
way to evaluate accuracy is to create a large set of experiments and determine how well
the IPS can classify safe and unsafe situations using the model.
Hypothesis 3 (Hyp. 3) requires that the EPPIPS can determine whether a command
to alter settings in a PLC is harmful within reasonable real-time requirements. To evaluate
Hyp. 3, the latency as EPPIPS makes the prediction must be measured. Because of this
latency, there is a delay before the PLC actually receives the payload. The impact of the
delay could cause the PLC to be unable to respond to the physical process in the way that
a plant operator would desire. For example, if the plant operator is issuing commands from
an HMI to a PLC to regulate a physical process manually, there is a chance that as the
packet is evaluated, an undesired result occurs. The physical system’s process variable may
change somewhat while the delay occurs. To evaluate Hyp. 3, the prediction module is run
at various numbers of scan cycles to observe length of the prediction in terms of time. The
length becomes concerning when it is not negligible compared with the scan cycle time of
the ladder logic.
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Hypothesis 4 (Hyp. 4) states that EPPIPS will be able to detect threats that are valid
commands and programs and that appear normal from the perspective of the network
characteristics but carry a malicious payload. To evaluate Hyp. 4, EPPIPS must be shown
to detect valid malicious commands whose payloads induce an unsafe state. For this
hypothesis, command packets that violate safety may be dissected to verify that they follow
the format of Modbus.
To demonstrate the validity of these hypotheses, the fundamental types of
situations that the ICS can experience must be understood and performed as experiments.
These situations include normal operations and various attacks in the threat model. The
experiments must be applied to the ICS in a systematic fashion, which requires automation
through scripts especially for determining the accuracy in classifications to demonstrate
Hyp. 2.
6.3.1 Fundamental Situations for Experiments
Experiments were performed for various situations of cyber-attacks and normal operation.
The rogue VM exists as the foreign node described in Chapter 3. The rogue VM is
responsible for carrying out a portion of the cyberattacks that include the injection attacks.
In addition, a compromised node that is part of the SCADA system and is a trusted device
will also carry out injection attacks. The work incorporates the injection attacks to carry
out malicious commands since these attacks can change the PLCs' settings and are therefore
considered the primary types of attacks. Also important, but not as directly impactful as
the primary attack categories, is a secondary attack that serves an auxiliary function to aid
the primary attacks. For example, if an attacker manages to gain access to an ICS network
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as a foreign node, the attacker may not have foreknowledge of the state of registers in the
PLC indicating important information such as the process variable. In this case, the attacker
can perform requests for such information by spoofing as a legitimate device. The rogue
device sends Modbus request packets to the PLC for reconnaissance. This attack is
commonly referred to as a point-scan attack. The attack categories are a modified version
of those described in the works by Gao, whose contribution is a useful attack taxonomy for
Modbus [16], [27].
Regarding the settings in the ladder logic for certain testbeds, the ladder logic of
the PLC has multiple modes, one which is manual and the others are automatic. These
testbeds are the pipeline with variable speed pump (VSP), storage tank with VSP, and
HVAC. Such settings allow for certain ways that injection attacks can use to manipulate
the settings. The ladder logic for the governor of the generator testbed does not have
multiple modes, except to turn on or off, but has what amounts to an automatic mode to
regulate the engine. Manual mode causes the ICS to operate so that the HMI is in direct
control of the actuator states in the system. Therefore, the impact on the physical process
is direct. In this case, the PLC acts as a simple non-autonomous device. On the other hand,
in the automatic mode, the PLC can control the physical process according to its own
autonomous program. The settings associated with automatic mode indirectly impact the
physical process. Table 6.1a-b lists these primary attacks and the variables in the various
testbeds affected by the attacks. These variables correspond to registers that are explained
in Appendix A. Table 6.1a-b also identifies the potential impacts of the attacks. Table 6.2
shows the auxiliary attack that the rogue device uses to make the primary attacks more
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destructive. The auxiliary attacks perform reconnaissance to determine the values of
critical variables of the industrial control system.
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Table 6.1a: Primary Command-based Attacks

Name

Impact

Method

Testbed

PLC Variables Affected

Specific Potential Harmful
Impact

Command
Injection

Pipeline with
VSP

Pump Register (%QW5)

Unsafe Level of Liquid

Type

Altered
Actuator State

Direct

Intensity (%QW6)

Storage Tank
with VSP

Pump Register (%QW5)

Unsafe Pressure

Intensity (%QW6)

Altered
Control Mode

Indirect

Command
Injection

Generator

N/A

N/A

HVAC

Heat Register (%QW4)

Unsafe
or
Temperature

Storage Tank
with VSP

Mode Register (%QW4)

Must be used in conjunction
with another settings to cause
harmful impact

Water Tank
with VSP

Mode Register (%QW4)

Generator

N/A

HVAC

Mode Register (%QW3)

117

Inconvenient

Table 6.1b: Primary Command-based Attacks

Name

Impact

Method

Testbed

Registers Affected

Specific Potential Harmful
Impact

Command
Injection

Pipeline with
VSP

Pump Register (%QW5)

Unsafe Level of Liquid

Type

Altered
System
Control
Point

Set

Indirect
through
Parameters

Intensity (%QW6)

Storage Tank
with VSP

Pump Register (%QW5)

Unsafe Pressure

Intensity (%QW6)

Altered
System
Control
Scheme

Indirect
through
Parameters

Command
Injection

Generator

N/A

N/A

HVAC

Heat Register (%QW4)

Unsafe
or
Temperature

Storage Tank
with VSP

P,I Registers

Must
be
used
in
conjunction with another
setting to cause harmful
impact

(%QW4)

Water Tank
with VSP

Mode
(%QW4)

Generator

Gain Parameter

HVAC
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Inconvenient

Register

(%QW2)

Causes low power quality,
and potential damage to
connected equipment.

N/A

N/A

Table 6.2: Auxiliary Attack

Name

Method

Spoofing Reconnaissance Injection (Request)
Attack on Sensor Data

Cases that are devoid of any adversary are also important. Experimenting with these
cases allows for a comparison with a baseline functioning of the SCADA system. Normal
Conditions and Operations refer to situations for the SCADA system where no cyberattacks affect the SCADA system. Users can perform commands and operate the SCADA
systems normally as the designers intended these SCADA systems to run. Typically,
normal operation will involve acceptable settings chosen for the automatic mode of the
ICS. Normal operation may also involve using manual mode. In this case, a user at an HMI
would control the behavior of the ICS directly. Table 6.3 summarizes the normal operations
and conditions used in this work.
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Table 6.3: Normal Operations and Conditions

Name

Method

Automatic Mode with setting Commands from HMI on settings and Requests
changes

(Legitimate)
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6.3.2 Major Categories of Experiments and Variations
The experimental scenarios that run on the setup are based on the fundamental situations
that an ICS can experience and variations and combinations of these situations. The
experiments were chosen to test the versatility of EPPIPS in detecting a variety of attacks
affecting different settings at various times in the simulation and in cases in which the
physical system is in various states. The main purpose of running large sets of these
experimental scenarios is to validate Hyp 2. The scenarios divide into two broad categories
of experiments that will be conducted: (1) Normal Conditions and Operations and (2)
Cyberattacks. The first category consists purely of normal operations described above. The
second major category, which involves attacks overlaying normal operations, consists of
five subcategories: (a) High Setpoint Attack, (b) Switch to PI Control with Random
Settings, (c) Switch to Manual Mode with Pump on, (d) Targeted Attack from Rogue, and
(e) Targeted Attack from HMI. The attacks choose some of the values for their settings at
random. The randomization uses a uniform distribution so that the space of possible
parameters for the attacks has relatively even coverage. The following table summarizes
these scenarios types used in the experiments (Table 6.4):
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Table 6.4: Scenarios Types

Category

Subcategory

Registers Affected

Normal

Automatic

Unaffected

Attack

High Setpoint Attack

High Setpoint (%QW8)

Switch to PI Control with Random Settings

Mode register (%QW4)
P Gain Register (%QW1)
I Gain Register (%QW2)
Reference Register

Switch to Manual Mode with Pump on

Mode register (%QW4)
Pump Register (%QW5)
Intensity (%QW6)

Targeted Attack from Rogue

Mode register (%QW4)
Pump Register (%QW5)
Intensity (%QW6)

Targeted Attack from Compromised HMI

Mode register (%QW4)
Pump Register (%QW5)
Intensity (%QW6)
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The high setpoint attack involves the rogue VM injecting commands to the PLC to
change the high setpoint. The rogue VM randomly selects the value for setting the high
setpoint register and launches the attack at a random point in time during the simulation.
Although this attack seems simple, it is chosen to test EPPIPS's ability to transfer important
status information of the ladder logic variables, such as the state of the pump and also the
accuracy of prediction when compared with the actual behavior.
The attack to switch to PI control with Random Settings is also an attack the rogue
device carries out. This attack involves injecting a command to change multiple registers
simultaneously. The affected registers are the mode register, the P gain register, I gain
register, and the reference register. The attack changes the mode register to 3 to enter into
PI control mode. The attack also randomly selects values for the P and I gains. The rogue
device launches the attack at a random time during the simulation.
The attack to switch to manual mode and turn on the pump in this work uses an
injected command to change multiple registers, specifically three for this attack. One
register affected is the mode, which is changed to 1 to cause the ladder logic program to
enter into manual mode. Another register is the pump register, which turns on the pump
when the register is equal to 1. The third is the register for the intensity, which is a randomly
chosen value.
The targeted attack from the rogue device is an attack intended to inflict damage on
the ICS. This attack uses an auxiliary reconnaissance attack to determine the state of the
process variable periodically. When the process variable reaches a given value as the ladder
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logic program is functioning as normal, then the targeted attack will act similarly to the
attack to change to manual mode and turn on the pump. However, in this case, the targeted
attack will choose the maximum value for the pump’s intensity setting.
The targeted attack from the HMI is for representing the situation in which malware
or a malicious user compromises the HMI. At a random time in the simulation, this attack
launches an attack to change multiple registers so that the PLC enters manual mode and
turns on the pump at the highest intensity. The purpose of this attack is to demonstrate that
the HMI, a trusted system, can be the node through which the attack occurs against the
PLC.

6.3.3 Automation of Scenarios
Because of the number and complexity of scenarios and the need for precise timing for
when attacks occur, it was necessary to create automation scripts to run from the host
machine. A master automation script resets the PLC’s main process and directs the rogue
virtual machine used in the experimental setup to behave appropriately for a given scenario.
For example, the script signals the rogue device when to launch the scenario and which of
the 6 types of scenarios to use. The scenarios types are enumerated from 0 - 5, and the
script randomly chooses one of the values to determine what scenario type to launch. The
script also specifies what settings to use for the attack. The master automation script runs
many iterations of each of the main categories of scenarios described above in subsection
6.2.2. The overarching script systematically runs through a large number of these scenarios
in order to achieve results that demonstrate the effectiveness of EPPIPS. For each scenario
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that runs, the “ground truth” is established from the MATLAB simulation as to whether
the scenario becomes safe or unsafe due to a command packet. Within each scenario,
EPPIPS makes a prediction based on the command packet. This prediction exists as timeseries data and may be compared with the ground-truth data to evaluate the IPS.
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CHAPTER 7.

RESULTS

This chapter discusses various notable results attained as a product of the experiments
conducted, data collected, and analysis performed to support this dissertation. The results
are examined in light of the hypotheses to evaluate EPPIPS.
First, a review of initial case studies demonstrated the effects of cyber-attacks and
how cyber-attacks harm various physical systems. Then, the chapter evaluated the
operation of EPPIPS in training and detecting other attacks based on the case studies. The
training stage produced the models that EPPIPS used in prediction. With the trained
models, experiments associated with EPPIPS were performed and examined. The
experiments included evaluating the performance in predictions by determining the
accuracy of the prediction and the latency for running the IPS prediction module when
predicting scan cycles in the future. In addition, experiments with the two related testbeds
- the pipeline with variable speed pump (VSP) and the storage tank with VSP - were
performed to determine accuracy in classification. Malicious ladder logic uploads and case
studies on incident response are also discussed. This chapter concludes with a discussion
and an analysis of the results.
7.1 Initial Experiments to Study Impacts of Cyber-Attacks
Initial experiments were conducted and analyzed as case studies to determine the impacts
of cyber-attacks on industrial control systems in multiple domains. The purpose of these
experiments was to test the hypothesis (Hyp. 1) that there exists a threat model which leads
to unsafe conditions for industrial control systems. These experiments were also performed
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to understand the specifics of how cyber-attacks achieve unsafe states. The case studies
considered attacks on a (1) storage tank system, (2) generator system, and (3) HVAC
system.
7.1.1 Storage Tank System
An experiment with an attack was performed against a water tank to cause an overflow
[17]. The ladder logic program of the PLC in the experiment has two modes, one automatic
and one manual. Automatic mode has a routine in the program that keeps the water level
between high and low setpoints. Manual mode allows a user at an HMI to have direct
control of the pump. Figure 7.1 shows two superimposed curves of water level expressed
as a percentage versus time for the water tank. One curve represents the true data of the
physical system (seen as a solid black line). The other curve represents the data as logged
by the HMI (seen as a dotted line with ‘+’ symbols at regular intervals).
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Figure 7.1: Storage Tank under Injection Attack
An attack was performed on the water tank 649.6 seconds into the experiment. An attacker
with access to the network injects packets to place the system in manual mode and to turn
on the pump. The injection is performed by sending Modbus/TCP packets to the PLC at a
much faster rate than the HMI does. The attacker performed the injection attack to cause
the system to go into an unsafe state, where an overflow would occur, thus confirming
Hypothesis 1. The attacker followed this injection with an Address Resolution Protocol
(ARP) spoofing attack. This technique consists of sending spoofed ARP messages into the
network to associate the attacker’s MAC address with the IP addresses of the PLC and the
HMI. The ARP spoofing allows the attacker to intercept data frames on the network,
modify the traffic, or stop all traffic by dropping all communication frames, causing a
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Denial of Service (DoS). The attack also prevented the user at the HMI from monitoring
or controlling the system. The attacker accomplished this using the DoS attack on the top
of the ARP spoofing. This attack was inspired by the Maroochi attack, in which packets
were injected to alter a water treatment plant’s behavior in adverse ways [60]. The attack
was also inspired by a software malfunction on a controller at the Browns Ferry Nuclear
Power Plant of the Tennessee Valley Authority, in which a flood of packets prevented the
controller’s normal operation and its ability to communicate with other nodes in the system.
Therefore, the resulting behavior was like a DoS attack [45]. Note that in Figure 7.1, the
logged data at the HMI discontinued when the DoS attack began as expected since the HMI
was no longer able to receive new updates on the system’s state.
7.1.2 Generator System
Another network-based attack performed was an injection attack against the gain
parameter in the generator testbed’s control system. The Digital Control System (DCS) in
the generator stores the gain as an accessible value in a register. An attacker who has access
to the network can inject a single command packet to change the value of the register [7].
During normal conditions, the generator’s governor causes the angular velocity (ω, or
omega) of the shaft in the generator to converge to the desired setpoint (Figure 7.2 - left).
This convergence was necessary to produce output at the correct frequency in a short
amount of time and to ensure that the resulting waveform is stable. The waveform is shown
for 10 seconds as AC voltage oscillating at 60Hz and becoming positive and negative
(Figure 7.3 - left). Note that the waveforms in Figure 7.3 appear solidly blue because of
the rapid oscillations relative to the full time period of the plot. When the injected packet
sent a command to the DCS to change the gain to be three times as large as the original
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value, the control system was unable to settle on the desired angular velocity. Instead, its
behavior became chaotic (Figure 7.2 - right) due to its inability to settle to a constant
frequency output. The resulting voltage waveform was irregular in shape (Figure 7.3 right), indicating poor power quality. The variations in frequency were great enough to
inhibit other connected power sources from remaining synchronized, which could harm the
devices being powered by the generator. In practice a frequency variation of 1.5 Hertz is
often considered problematic, with variations of 4 Hertz or more resulting in damage to
attached equipment, even if no other synchronized generators are in use [9]. When the
attack occurred, the frequency variation became greater than 30 Hertz in 10 seconds, which
far exceeds what is allowed for power systems in the electric grid. Therefore, this example
confirms Hypothesis 1 for the generator system.
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Figure 7.2: Speed of shaft - normal conditions (left) vs attack on gain (right)
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Figure 7.3: Resulting waveform - normal conditions (left) vs attack on gain (right)
7.1.3 HVAC System
Several experiments in this work were performed for the HVAC system to illustrate
various scenarios where a cyber-attack can induce harm in the physical world. The
experiments were performed on a virtual testbed that included the Simulink model of the
HVAC system and virtual machines for the PLC and a malicious rogue device on the
network. The rogue device launched the attacks with python-based tools. One of the tools
used the pymodbus library to inject Modbus write command packets to registers in a given
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PLC target. The scenarios were (1) Normal Conditions, (2) Malicious Ladder Logic
Upload, and (3) Injection Attack to Change Settings.
In normal conditions, the HVAC system is running in automatic - heat mode, which
is a hysteresis mode with a user-defined setting of 22oC. The program can use this value to
compute high and low setpoints at offsets above and below the user setting. The goal of
the ladder logic program in that mode is to maintain the temperature between those two
setpoints. An illustration of this is seen in Figure 7.4 on the left. It was observed that the
temperature rose when the heater was turned on as expected until it was slightly above the
user-defined setpoint. At which point, the heater was turned off, allowing the room
temperature to decrease until it reached a point slightly lower than the user-defined
setpoint. The decrease in temperature is expected because of the heat transfer from the
inside of the building to the outside, which was colder. This pattern repeated itself.
In the case of a malicious upload, a program is sent with some changes to the rungs
in section 3 of the ladder logic (Appendix A) that causes the heat to always be turned on.
At the same time, the cooling system is activated to regulate the temperature. If the
temperature is greater than or equal to the high setpoint, the cooling system is turned on to
bring the temperature down. If the temperature falls to a level equal to or less than the low
setpoint, the cooling system turns off to allow the heat of the other system to bring the
temperature up. This can be seen in Figure 7.4 (center). In this case, the goal of the attack
is to regulate the temperature and deceptively fool the user that everything is normal since
the HVAC system maintains the desired temperature. However, the cumulative cost of
running the HVAC system becomes much greater because the heating and cooling systems
are used to a greater extent.
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For a scenario of the HVAC involving a command injection attack, a change in a
register or multiple registers can influence the behavior of the system adversely. In this
case, a rogue device on the network can send a command to the PLC to switch to manual
mode and then to turn on the heat, which can lead to unfavorable conditions (Figure 7.4 on
right), where the temperature becomes high. The temperature reaches a temperature of
approximately 35oC (95oF). If the room regulated by the HVAC were a server room, this
temperature would be problematic. Commercial guidelines for server rooms suggest that
the acceptable temperature ranges from 50oF to 82oF while the optical range is from 68oF
to 71oF [61]. The high temperature of 95oF caused by the attack exceeds these ranges.
Therefore, this example supports Hypothesis 1. Operating costs associated with the three
scenarios over time can be seen in Figure 7.5.

Figure 7.4: HVAC Scenarios
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Figure 7.5: Operating Cost of Running HVAC over Time

7.1.4 Notes on Case Studies
The experiments above, performed by the author of this dissertation and examined
as case studies, demonstrate that cyber-attacks can manipulate an ICS to cause unsafe states
and other harmful effects on the physical system, such as increased inefficiency or cost.
Therefore, the case studies show Hypothesis 1 to be valid. EPPIPS was created to address
the possibility of these attacks, which exist as malicious commands and ladder logic. The
case studies are detailed examples representing a more extensive and complicated set of
attacks developed in this work to test EPPIPS. What follows is an evaluation of the
EPPIPS’s operation starting with the training phase. EPPIPS is also evaluated in terms of
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detecting and responding to cyber-attacks causing unsafe conditions like those described
in the initial case studies.

7.2 Evaluation of Training Phase
In order to test or deploy EPPIPS so that EPPIPS can detect and respond to relevant cyberattacks, training must be performed. Chapter 5 describes a set of steps that comprise the
training phase for EPPIPS. These training steps are necessary to construct models for
EPPIPS to begin operating and evaluating packets because the models are needed to predict
the packets’ potential impact on the physical system. The results of carrying out those steps
are presented with the final results of producing ARMA models as follows.
Steps 1 - 3 of the training were performed for all four of the testbeds using input
and output training data. The following are example training data that include inputs and
outputs of the physical systems for each of the four testbeds. The following figures
represent the behavior of the generator system (Fig. 7.6), the pipeline with variable speed
pump (Fig. 7.7), the storage tank with variable speed pump (Fig. 7.8), and the HVAC (Fig
7.9) as input actuator and output sensor data over time in normal conditions. This
constitutes step 1, the collection of input and output time-series data.
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Figure 7.6: Generator System Data

Figure 7.7: Pipeline with Variable Speed Pump Data
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Figure 7.8: Storage Tank Data

Figure 7.9: HVAC System Data
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Using the collected input and output data for the physical system of each of the four
testbeds, the ARMA models were generated as seen in Table 7.1. Step 2 (Parameter
Estimation) and Step 3 (Validation), as described in Chapter 5, were performed using
special MATLAB scripts.
Table 7.1: ARMA Models of Testbeds.

Testbed

Generator
system

ARMA Model

Y(t) = a1y(t - 1) + a2y(t - 2) + a3y( t - 3) + b0u(t) + b1u(t - 1) b2u(t - 2) +b3u(t - 3),
where
a1= 1.040208954251386
a2= 0.909352363358398
a3= 0.949561322244234
b0= -0.049419144943353
b1= 0.145618768956640
b2= -0.143221577022754
b3= 0.047022016113484

Pipeline with
variable speed
pump

Y(t) = a1y(t - 1) - a2y(t - 2) + b0u(t) + b1u(t - 1) + b2u(t - 2)
where
a1= 0.999714977354464
a2= 0.000148698463945
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b0= 0.000022379893856
b1= 1.142044086153021
b2= 0.193866590867931

Storage Tank

Y(t) = a1Y(t - 1) + b0U(t),
where
a1= 0.999810021088242
b0= 0.036618090897553

HVAC System

Y(t) = a1Y(t - 1) + a2Y(t - 2) + a3Y(t - 3) + b0U(t) + b1U(t - 1)
where
a1= 0.857999961708890
a2= 0.26159696011423
a3= 0.046606131521656
b0= 3.289317522533990
b1= 2.481763089930594

EPPIPS uses these ARMA models for predictions when a payload in a command or
program arrives at the PLC. These models must be evaluated in terms of their performance
in making accurate predictions to fully satisfy Hypothesis 2.
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7.3 Evaluation of Performance in Predictions
This work uses criteria for evaluating the performance of the predictions that the IPS
makes. These are the (1) accuracy of the prediction in terms of the process variable and (2)
latency in making the prediction for a given number of scan cycles.
7.3.1 Accuracy in Predictions
Determining accuracy in predictions is important for judging the performance of this
dissertation and to compare with future work. Comparing time-series data of actual and
forecasted behavior with metrics such as MAPE and SMAPE in Chapter 5 for various
experiments aids in quantifying the accuracy. The reason both of these metrics were chosen
was to observe if they exhibit the same patterns in value for experiments. Using these
metrics, the author performed experiments involving the pipeline with the variable-speed
pump, in which different initial settings were applied for the setpoint and other settings in
the control algorithm. These experiments serve as a set of tests to observe how versatile
the pipeline model is for a variety of scenarios in the absence of attacks.
MAPE and SMAPE are calculated for each test in the given simulation window of
100 seconds. The reason that this window is chosen is that it captures the point that the data
reaches a first local maximum and beyond this point. The portion beyond the first local
maximum may capture another local maximum and show whether the actual and forecasted
behaviors become divergent over time. It is desired to observe if later behavior is more
difficult to predict.
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Additionally, MAPE and SMAPE are calculated from the start of the experiments
to the point in time where the actual time-series data comes to the first local maximum.
This portion of the data is relevant for studying how accurately the models can predict
impending behavior that approaches the unsafe state.
The first test (Figure 8.10a) has the pipeline with variable speed pump (VSP) in
hysteresis mode where the low setpoint is 8 PSI, and the high setpoint is 10 PSI. The second
test (Figure 8.10b) has the pipeline with VSP in PI mode, and the setpoint is set to 10 PSI.
The default value for KI is used. The third test (Figure 8.10c) places the setpoint at 15 PSI
in PI mode. The fourth test (Figure 8.10d) places the setpoint at 10 PSI and changes integral
gain parameter to a value of .02. By default, this parameter is set to .001. Therefore the
gain is increased by a factor of 20.

142

Figure 7.10: Pipeline - Tests of Accuracy in Predictions
Table 7.2: Pipeline - Prediction Results with Accuracy Metrics.

Test and Description of
Settings

100% - MAPE full (%)

100% -SMAPE full (%)

100% - MAPE
- to local
maximum (%)

100% - SMAPE
- to local
maximum (%)

(a) Hysteresis
Mode

95.0676

97.4276

88.8921

92.5688

(b) PI Mode, SP =
10PSI

98.7387

99.1619

87.2516

91.0975

(c) PI Mode, SP =
15PSI

98.6733

99.1675

88.7246

92.2561

143

(d) PI Mode, SP =
10PSI, KI =.02

93.3002

96.3399

66.7275

76.4979

These accuracy tests were also performed with the water tank. For the water tank,
the low and high setpoints of the hysteresis mode were set to 20% and 50% respectively
for the first test (Figure 7.11a below). The second test involved having the ladder logic
program set to the PI mode with the setpoint at 50%. The third test involves PI mode with
a setpoint of 75%. The fourth test has the setpoint at 50% for PI mode and increases the
integral gain parameter of the control algorithm by a factor of 20. These tests were meant
to be similar to those used in the pipeline.
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Figure 7.11: Storage Tank - Tests of Accuracy in Predictions

Table 7.3: Storage Tank - Prediction Results with Accuracy Metrics.

Test and Description of
Settings

100% - MAPE

100% - SMAPE

100% - MAPE
- to local
maximum (%)

100% - SMAPE
- to local
maximum (%)

(c) Hysteresis
Mode

98.6162

99.2822

98.6220

99.2669

(d) PI Mode, SP =
50%

83.7216

90.8383

83.7216

90.8383

(c) PI Mode, SP =
75%

89.6268

94.3021

89.6268

94.3021

(d) PI Mode, SP =
50%, KI =.02

95.7607

97.6461

95.7607

97.6461

From the results of the two above tables for the pipeline with VSP and storage tank
with VSP, which are related testbeds, the prediction accuracy in most cases for MAPE and
SMAPE are above 90% with some values approaching 100%. This would generally be
acceptable. However, in some cases, there are lower values for accuracy. In the case of the
pipeline when it is in PI mode with the highest value for KI, the accuracy value for SMAPE
(76.1%) is much lower in comparison with the other values for SMAPE of the other
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scenarios. The values for MAPE, the other metric for similarity in time series, has a similar
pattern. The reason that this case has the lowest value for the accuracy metrics is for the
following causes: (1) The ARMA model only captures some of the behavior in the pipeline
involving “momentum” in the process variable, but not completely. (2) the high value of
Ki causes a higher overshoot for the PI controller and this fact combined with the first
reason causes a greater difference between the actual and forecasted time-series data.
Whether these metric values are truly acceptable for the purpose of classification depends
on whether the models produced allow for accurate classification. Tt should be noted that
the pipeline has very high values for SMAPE over the full experiment. On the other hand,
the water tank has lower values for the PI controller but higher values in the case of the
hysteresis mode. When either of the testbeds are in the PI mode, the actuator signal as
dictated by the program has a greater variety of values than the hysteresis mode. In PI
mode, the actuators can take on a range values from 0 to 1. In contrast, hysteresis mode
uses two discrete values - 0 for “off” or another value for “on”. The lower accuracy in
prediction for the water tank when in PI mode is likely due to the fact that the water tank
is nonlinear. A value between 0 and 1 when applied to the water tank’s ARMA model may
not have the same exact effect on the testbed’s physical system. The reason for this is that
the ARMA model is linear, whereas the water tank has some nonlinearities in its behavior.
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7.3.2 Latency
Latency was studied by running the prediction submodule of EPPIPS described in Chapter
5 with the ladder logic programs of the testbeds. These programs include the hysteresis
controller and the PI controller. To conduct experiments with latency, the copy of the
ladder logic in the prediction submodule runs for a given number of scan cycles multiple
times since the resulting latency is not entirely deterministic. Other processes of the
operating system on which the ModOpenPLC process runs may interfere slightly with the
timing and contribute to this partial lack of determinism. Therefore, the mean of the results
for a given number of scan cycles is calculated to reduce the effect of disturbances and
interference from random software processes for more stable results. The calculation of the
mean is performed over various numbers of scan cycles. For example, the ModOpenPLC
process is run 10 times for 10,000 scancycles. The latency of each run is measured and
recorded. Then the average or mean of the resulting 10 latencies is calculated. These steps
are repeated for 20,000 scan cycles and so on. The results for latency for the following
described experiments demonstrate the mean simulation time, or mean latency versus the
number of predicted scan cycles.
The results shown in Figure 7.12 depict the ladder logic of the one-station pipeline
with variable-speed pump. The experiments were run on both a Raspberry Pi (RPI) 3 Model
B+ and on a virtual machine running on a core of an I7 processor. This same ladder logic
is also used for the storage tank with variable-speed pump. The ladder logic has multiple
modes (Hysteresis, Manual, and PI) as described in Chapter 6. The latency is determined
for all of the three modes. That is, the prediction is run three times, where a different mode
is selected each time.
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Figure 7.12: Latency Data for Storage tank/Pipeline Ladder Logic with Raspberry
Pi (Left) and VM (Right)

The plots above in Figure 7.12 show that the mode selected does not affect the latency of
the predictions for the given ladder logic. The reason for this is that the calculations for all
the modes are done for each scan cycle regardless of what mode is selected. What is also
noteworthy is that the latency for the Raspberry Pi is far greater than that of a VM. This is
expected since the Raspberry Pi is an embedded device and represents the hardware of a
typical PLC. For the ladder logic that is used, the scan cycle time is 0.1s. If it is desired to
make a prediction for 40,000 scan cycles or more into the future on the Raspberry Pi with
this ladder logic, the latency can exceed the actual time of the scan cycle according to
Figure 7.12 (Left). On the other hand, the latency for the VM running on a general-purpose
computer is negligible as compared to the scan cycle time. A latency in prediction that
exceeds scan cycle time implies that the real PLC running the ladder logic will go to the
next scan cycle before the payload that triggers a prediction is fully processed by the IPS.
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Figure 7.13 shows the latency for the HVAC ladder logic using the Raspberry Pi
and the VM. The ladder logic has less complexity than the ladder logic of the pipeline and
storage tank. The complexity is in terms of the number of rungs and the mathematical and
logic operations performed for each rung. Because the HVAC ladder logic’s complexity is
less than that of the pipeline and storage tank, the latency in making predictions with the
HVAC ladder logic is also less for a given number of clock cycles predicted. This smaller
latency is demonstrated in the resulting graphs (Figure 7.12) for the Raspberry PI and VM.

Figure 7.13: Latency Data for HVAC Ladder Logic with Raspberry Pi (Left) and VM
(Right)

Figure 7.14 shows the latency for the generator versus the number of scan cycles
predicted. Note that the scan cycle time for the ladder logic of the generator governor is
20ms. Therefore, predicting 10,000 in the future would be greater than the snan cycle time.
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Figure 7.14: Latency Data for Generator Ladder Logic with Raspberry Pi (Left) and
VM (Right)
The above plots for the various ladder logic of this work show that the latency for
running scan cycles of the ladder logic with the ARMA models is very small and even
negligible for the length of the scan cycle times used. Therefore, EPPIPS is able to meet
the real-time requirements of Hypothesis 3 of this work.

7.4 Evaluation of Classifying Incoming Payloads
In order to evaluate how well the IDS classifies the incoming command packets to diagnose
whether they are harmful, it is necessary to compare the predicted outcome with the
outcome that occurs for the “ground truth.” The ground truth can be defined as the true
condition and behavior of the physical process when an experiment is run. Note that when
conducting the experiments, all incident response actions by EPPIPS besides processing
packets are suspended, which means that payloads predicted to be harmful are not dropped
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or delayed. This allows the payload to be processed and to have an effect on the testbed so
that the comparison can be made with the prediction.
In this work, classifications are made according to two main schemes: (1) safe vs.
unsafe and (2) no imminent danger vs. imminent danger. The first scheme involves
classifying the incoming packet as safe or unsafe. The term safe in this dissertation means
that the process variable remains within the safety conditions defined in the specification.
The term unsafe means the process variable violated the conditions. Classifications are also
made in this manner for whether a given scenario is imminently dangerous or not
imminently dangerous. Imminent Danger means the process variable becomes unsafe
within a predefined amount of time given in the specification, whereas No Imminent danger
means that the process variable remains safe in the given time period. However, for the
case of no imminent danger, the process variable may be safe or unsafe after the time
period.
Evaluating the IDS’s ability to make classifications for an individual experiment
involves comparing the prediction of EPPIPS in that experiment to the ground truth data
of the experiment. If the IDS predicts that a command will cause the physical system to
become unsafe when, in reality according to the ground truth data, the physical system
remains safe, then this is called a false positive (FP) in detecting the unsafe condition. On
the other hand, if the IDS predicts a safe condition and the physical system actually
becomes unsafe, then this constitutes a false negative (FN). When the command is correctly
classified as unsafe, this constitutes a true positive (TP). A correctly classified safe scenario
is a true negative (TN). These same concepts in comparing the ground truth with the
prediction also apply to imminent danger. When many scenarios are run with command
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packets arriving at the PLC, EPPIPS will classify them. A measure of accuracy that
represents all the experiments can be made concerning EPPIPS. This measure is termed
classification accuracy. Classification accuracy is defined as the number of classified
scenarios divided by the total number of scenarios. Classification accuracy is expressed
using mathematical notation in Equation 7.1:

This approach of evaluating the accuracy of the classification with regard to safety is based
on Lin’s work [3, 4].
For the experiments in classification, results were achieved by running the master
automation script described in Chapter 6. The script runs a large number of scenarios for
the two related testbeds - the pipeline with Variable Speed Pump (VSP) and the storage
tank with VSP. During these scenarios, EPPIPS makes predictions starting from when the
attack occurs to the end of the scenario. The scenarios are each 100 seconds for the pipeline,
and the scenarios are 300 seconds for the storage tank since the storage tank has a much
slower response. The results are described overall and by scenario type. confusion matrices
for given for each of the testbeds in addition to the classification accuracies. Selected
Scenarios including attacks and normal operations are described with plots in the following
subsections for the two related testbeds.
The breakdown in terms of number of scenarios by type for both testbeds are seen
in Table 7.4. Pie charts in Figure 7.15 illustrate the percentage breakdown of the scenarios
by type for the testbeds.
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Table 7.4 Number of Scenarios by Type in Related Testbeds:

Code

Scenario Type

Pipeline with VSP

Storage
with VSP

ST0

Normal Operations

19

11

ST1

High Setpoint Attack

21

13

ST2

PI Control Attack

18

17

ST3

Manual Mode Attack

17

23

ST4

Targeted Attack from Rogue

11

21

ST5

Targeted Attack from HMI

14

15

Figure 7.15 Pie Chart Representation of Scenarios by Type
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Tank

Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 show the confusion matrices for the pipeline with VSP as
a result of running 100 experiments. The classification accuracy for safety was 98%, and
the classification accuracy with respect to imminent danger was 98%.
Table 7.5 Confusion Matrix for Classifying Pipeline Scenarios - Safe vs. Unsafe

Predicted

Actual

Safe

Unsafe

Safe

55

0

Unsafe

2

43

Table 7.6 Confusion Matrix for Classifying Pipeline Scenarios - Imminent Danger

Predicted
No
Imminent Imminent Danger
Danger
Actual

No
Imminent 59
Danger

0

Imminent
Danger

39

2
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The storage tank with variable-speed pump was also used for experimentation with
100 scenarios. The resulting confusion matrices are produced below. Table 7.7 is the
confusion matrix that shows the performance of classifying the scenarios with the storage
tank as safe or unsafe. The classification accuracy for safety was 96%. Likewise, Table
7.8 shows the performance in classifying imminent danger. The classification accuracy
with regard to imminent danger was 100%.
Table 7.7 Confusion Matrix for Classifying Storage Tank Scenarios - Safe vs. Unsafe

Predicted

Actual

Safe

Unsafe

46

46

0

Unsafe

4

50
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Table 7.8 Confusion Matrix for Classifying Storage Tank Scenarios - Imminent
Danger

Predicted
No Imminent Danger Imminent Danger
Actual

No
Imminent 100
Danger

0

Imminent
Danger

0

0

For these sets of scenarios above, it is important to examine the misclassified cases.
The misclassified cases for the pipeline were false negatives. These cases were scenarios
69 and 84. EPPIPS also had two false negatives when classifying imminent danger versus
danger for the pipeline: Scenarios 69 and 84. Figure 7.16 shows scenario 69. Figure 7.17
shows scenario 84. The following two plots representing the misclassified cases show
curves for the actual behavior or ground truth in blue and the predicted behavior by EPPIPS
in red. The time of the attacks is shown as a black dashed line. The maximum safety
thresholds are represented by horizontal red dashed lines.
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Figure 7.16: Pipeline Scenario 69

Figure 7.17: Pipeline Scenario 84
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The misclassified cases for the water tank are false negatives. There are four false negatives
when classifying safe versus unsafe for the storage tank: Scenarios 13, 33, 36, and 38.
Figure 7.18 shows Scenario 13, and Figure 7.19 shows Scenario 33. Figure Figure 7.20
illustrates Scenario 36, and Figure 7.21 illustrates 38. There were no misclassified cases
for the storage tank when classifying imminent harm because the water tank has a much
slower response when compared to the water tank.

Figure 7.18: Storage Tank Scenario 13

158

Figure 7.19: Storage Tank Scenario 33
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Figure 7.20: Storage Tank Scenario 36
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Figure 7.21: Storage Tank Scenario 38

For the misclassified cases of the Storage tank, the predicted behavior falls short of the
max safety threshold (See red curves of Figures 7.18, 7.19, 7.20, 7.21). However, the actual
behavior does cross the threshold (See blue curves of Figure 7.18, 7.19, 7.20, 7.21). The
slopes of the blue and red curves in each of these cases are not equivalent. This is due to
some nonlinear behavior in the storage tank and to the linear behavior of the prediction.
This becomes apparent when the pump is not running its full intensity.
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Representative scenarios of the two related testbeds - the storage tank and the
pipeline - are also studied. These representative scenarios are for the major scenario types
explained in Chapter 7. Figure 7.22a-f depicts selected example scenarios representing the
scenario types for pipeline with variable speed pump. Likewise, Figure 7.23a-f shows
example scenarios for the storage tank with variable speed pump. These scenarios for both
testbeds are (a) normal, (b) high-setpoint attack, (c) PI control attack, (d) manual mode
attack, (e) targeted attack from rogue, (f) Targeted attack from HMI. The purpose of the
selected scenarios are to provide examples and explanations for scenarios types in how
they typically behave.
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Figure 7.22: Pipeline with VSP - Selected Examples from Each Scenario Type
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Figure 7.23 Storage Tank with VSP - Selected Examples from Each Scenario Type
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Normal Operations: Figure 7.22a depicts the pipeline with VSP under normal operations.
Likewise, Figure 7.23a depicts the storage tank with VSP under normal operations. Ladder
logic programs in hysteresis mode are controlling both physical processes so that they
possess safe behavior with a given load. The blue curves in the figures represent the true
behavior of these testbeds over time. Note that all of the other scenario types assume that
the ICS is under these normal operations until the attack occurs.
High Setpoint Attack: Figure 7.22b shows the pipeline undergoing an attack in which the
rogue device sends a Modbus command packet to change the high setpoint randomly. In
this case, the high setpoint is selected to be above the maximum safe state. For the pipeline,
the attack occurs 20 seconds into the experiment and the new setting for the high setpoint
is 11.94 PSI. Both the blue and the red curves that represent the actual and predicted
behavior eventually cross the maximum safety threshold. This attack is also performed for
the storage tank with VSP in Figure 7.23b. For the storage tank, the attack occurs 248
seconds into the experiment and sets the high setpoint register to 52.5%, which does not
cross the threshold.
PI Control Attack: For this attack from the rogue device, as seen in Figure 7.22c and Figure
7.23c, the PI mode is selected and the reference or setpoint is chosen to be above the
maximum safe state. The gain parameters are changed for the control system. The rogue
device makes all of these changes using a single command for changing multiple registers
in Modbus. The attack occurs against the pipeline seconds into the experiment. The P gain
is set to 68, and the I gain is set to .005. The reference is set to 11.68 PSI. As can be
observed in Figure 8.9c, the process variable goes to its steady state, which is the reference
setpoint. For the storage tank, the attack occurs 23 seconds into the experiment. The P gain
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is set to 51. The I gain is set to .007, which is 7 times higher than it usually is. The reference
is also set to 13.31%, which is far lower than the safety threshold. In Figure 8.9, actual and
predicted behavior slope downward as expected since the PI controller is designed to reach
setpoint, which is much lower than the process variable (the pressure) when the attack first
begins.
Manual Mode Attack: This attack involved the rogue device changing the mode to manual
mode, turning on the pump, and randomly selecting an intensity level for the variable-speed
pump. For the pipeline example in Figure 7.22d, the attack occurred 80 seconds into the
experiment at a high intensity for the pump. For the storage tank example in Figure 7.23d,
the time the attack occurred was 261 seconds into the experiment. The intensity level was
randomly set to 22.4%.
Targeted Attack from Rogue: In this attack, the rogue device uses the auxiliary attack to
query the PLC for information concerning the state of the process variable. Once the
process variable reaches a value determined by the rogue device, the rogue turns on the
pump and chooses the maximum setting for the pump. Figure 7.22e depicts this attack for
the pipeline with VSP. When the process variable equals 9.65 PSI or more in the PLC’s
normal operation, the attack turns on the pump at full speed. Figure 7.23e depicts the attack
for the storage with VSP. For the storage tank, the attack starts when the process variable
is equal or greater to 11.1%.
Targeted Attack from HMI: In this case, the HMI is assumed to have been compromised
and the malicious software on the HMI launches the attack at a random time. When the
HMI launches the attack, the HMI sends a command to change the PLC to manual mode,
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turn on the pump with the maximum setting for the speed. Figure 7.22f depicts this attack
for the pipeline with VSP, which randomly occurs 64 seconds into the experiment. Figure
7.23f depicts the attack for the storage tank with VSP that launches 66 seconds into the
experiment. As a result of the attacks, the actual behavior moves upward rapidly for both
testbeds.
The results of these scenarios were presented numerically and graphically to allow
for understanding and comparison between the two related testbeds and to evaluate the
performance of EPPIPS in classifications. From the results seen in the confusion matrices,
the values for accuracy were reasonably high. The accuracy in classifying safe versus
unsafe for the pipeline is 98%. There were only a few cases that are misclassified. The
accuracy in classifying with regard to imminent dangers was 98% for the pipeline. For the
storage tank, the accuracy was 96% in classifying with respect to safety, and the accuracy
was 100% in classifying with respect to imminent danger. EPPIPS classifying capability
was largely able to perform as intended because of the high accuracy rate. Therefore,
Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. Researchers typically desire to approach an ideal accuracy of
100% for intrusion detection systems, even if the ideal accuracy is not always achievable
in the real world. Because of this, it is important to understand the issues that cause the
misclassification in order to mitigate against the misclassification. The misclassified cases
are generally due to slight modeling error or inaccuracy of the models when the experiment
causes the process variable to be close to the unsafe region. Because of this potential issue,
it may be advisable to have a region below the unsafe region called a “high-risk” region. If
the prediction reaches the high-risk region, then EPPIPS should flag this and treat the
situation as if it is unsafe.
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7.5 Evaluation of Ladder Logic Uploads
EPPIPS is also capable of evaluating ladder logic uploads. Before the main PLC process
receives the new ladder logic, EPPIPS predicts how the ladder logic would cause the cyberphysical system to behave given the ladder logic's default settings for a number of scan
cycles. This can be considered a pre-screening to ensure that there are no time bombs within
that window of clock cycles. However, if the malicious portion of the ladder logic code
only becomes active with specific settings or states of registers, EPPIPS can diagnose the
situation only if an event is about to trigger the malicious part of the ladder logic. The
following plots depict the predictions of EPPIPS when evaluating a normal ladder logic
program (Figure 7.24a), malicious ladder logic program with a time bomb (Figure 7.24b),
and a malicious ladder logic program with a logic bomb (Figure 7.24c). The normal is seen
in the pre-screening evaluation as benign. The time bomb is detected in pre-screening
evaluation since the malicious element of the time bomb occurred within the prediction
window. The ladder logic bomb is triggered when the user or a computer process sends a
command to the PLC to change the mode of operation to PI Control. The default setting is
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hysteresis

mode.

Figure 7.24: Predictions from Prescreening Ladder Logic Uploads
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For the case of the program with a logic bomb, it is not clear that the ladder logic is benign.
Evaluation of the ladder logic by prescreening the ladder logic did not detect the presence
of the logic bomb. Only when the ladder logic has been loaded to the PLC can the
determination be made. The figure below shows behavior of the physical system controller
by the PLC when running the logic bomb. Figure 7.25a shows the logic bomb without any
external command triggering the bomb. Figure 7.25b shows the logic bomb with a
command sent to trigger the bomb. In this scenario, a prediction is made by EPPIPS when
the command comes to the PLC.
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Figure 7.25: Malicious Ladder Logic (Logic Bomb) Loaded to PLC.
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7.6 Incident Response and Other Related Case Studies
Besides being able to diagnose payloads concerning safety and immediate danger, EPPIPS
can respond to them also. Several experiments were performed to observe how EPPIPS
responds in various conditions. These experiments include normal conditions in Figure
8.26a, a manual mode attack with a low intensity setting in Figure 8.26b, and manual mode
attack with a high intensity setting in Figure 8.26c. The first case is benign in nature. In
the second case, which had the low intensity setting, EPPIPS allows the PLC to process
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the

command

Figure 7.26 Incident Response Tests
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packet.

Even if the process variable eventually becomes unsafe, it is not imminently dangerous
(Figure 8.26b). On the other hand, if the EPPIPS predicts imminently dangerous behavior,
then it will drop the command packet (Figure 8.26c).
In addition to these incident response cases, a scenario is run where the pipeline
begins in normal operation and an attack occurs. This is done to observe how EPPIPS
responds but also how the attack appears on the network. Figure 7.26 shows a wireshark
log of packets between two nodes in the network: the PLC and the HMI.

Figure 7.27 Wireshark Log
One of the packets originated from the HMI and changed the settings for the PLC using
the “Write Multiple Registers” Modbus command. The overall traffic and this command
appear as valid commands. However, the command caused adverse behavior to the ICS
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(Figure 7.28). EPPIPS is able to detect this seemingly normal command that comes from a
trusted system since it comes from the HMI and predict its effect accurately. This
prediction is shown in the figure where the predicted behavior very closely matched the
actual behavior. This experiment therefore demonstrates validation of Hyp 4.

Figure 7.28 Effect of Harmful Command from HMI

A final case study was examined in which the Safety Instrumented System (SIS) is
added to the testbed, and the pipeline with variable-speed pump is running with normal
operation in hysteresis mode. An attack occurs slightly after 46 seconds into the simulation
to set the PLC to manual mode and turn on the pump to 10% of maximum setting for the
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speed. When the pressure reaches a defined threshold in the SIS, which is equivalent to the
maximum safety threshold, the SIS will disengage the pump from running completely. The
following plot illustrates this scenario (Figure 7.29).

Figure 7.29: Pipeline Scenario with SIS Undergoing Attack (10% Speed)

In the figure 7.29 above, EPPIPS predicts the behavior on the process variable that the
attack induces. The reason that the actual behavior of the process variable goes downward
after the PV crosses the max safety threshold is that the SIS has taken action to counteract
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the effect of the attack. The reason that this occurs somewhat beyond the max safety
threshold is that the pipeline has some delay in its response.
The command injection attack was also performed in a similar fashion against the
pipeline, but this time the attack turned the pump on to its full speed (100%). Figure 7.30
illustrates the scenario below. When the SIS counteracts the PV going beyond the
threshold, the PV rises farther than in the case of the attack running the pump at 10%.

Figure 7.30: Pipeline Scenario with SIS Undergoing Attack (100% Speed)

177

Using the SIS is helpful to avoid or mitigate against unsafe states and ultimately
harm to the ICS, however the ICS is shut down and is kept from doing useful operation.
As seen in Figure 7.29 and 7.30, EPPIPS is able to make a prediction of how the command
will behave. EPPIPS is also able to attribute the command packet as causing the issue.
When plant personnel investigate the incident, they can use EPPIPS to identify whether the
source of the problem was attributed to a cyber event. Knowing the nature of the issue aids
them in resetting the ICS so that the issue can potentially be avoided in the future.

7.7 Overall Discussion and Analysis
The initial experiments demonstrated the existence of threats that can cause harmful
behaviors in ICS. The large sets of experiments involving the pipeline with VGP and
storage tank with VGP also demonstrated variations of attacks that could drive the ICS to
unsafe states. A typical PLC connected to a network has ports open for Modbus and for
ladder logic uploads to allow the plant personal and legitimate processes to carry out their
normal functioning of the ICS. Adversaries who have access to the network can send valid
packets with harmful payloads to the PLC through the ports that are open. Even if
authentication and encryption are being utilized to thwart cyber-attacks against the PLC,
an attacker who has compromised a trusted node, such as the HMI would still be able to
launch the attacks studied in this work. The experiments with attacks studied in this work
support Hypothesis 1. Therefore, defensive measures must be put in place by the PLC that
can respond to valid packets with harmful payloads.
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As seen from EPPIPS's accuracy in predictions and classifying scenarios as either
safe versus unsafe, EEPIPS is effective in predicting what a change in a setting would do,
therefore supporting Hypothesis 2. Cases in which EPPIPS fails to detect a harmful packet
are generally due to situations where the actual scenario becomes barely outside the safety
condition and is predicted as safe. Even if a model is fairly accurate to represent an actual
physical system, there are cases where minor differences between the model and the actual
physical system produce erroneous results. The results also show that EPPIPS can make
predictions in a short period of time without affecting the overall performance of the PLC
and ICS overall. Therefore, the experiments support Hypothesis 3.
Commands sent to the PLC to change settings can appear as normal from a network
perspective. However, the effects of these commands are unknown unless deep packet
inspection of packets that encapsulate the command and prediction are performed. With
the results established in this dissertation, EPPIPS demonstrates that the IPS can perform
the deep packet inspection and make a prediction on whether a given valid command is
harmful, thus validating Hypothesis 4.
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CHAPTER 8.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

This work presents testbeds spanning multiple engineering domains to test a novel
intrusion detection system (IPS) called the Embedded Process Prediction Intrusion
Prevention System (EPPIPS). EPPIPS was a significant contribution of the research and
consists of a proxy process internal to the PLC to evaluate incoming command packets and
ladder logic using a form of dynamic analysis. EPPIPS employed methods to predict the
cyber-physical system's behavior due to the commands or programs before the PLC
actually processes them. The prediction allowed EPPIPS to infer whether a malicious
attack is occurring based on what the effect of the attack would have on the system. The
attack took the form of a command or a program with a malicious objective, which involved
causing physical harm to the ICS. In the case of SCADA systems, which involve physical
processes, it is crucial to consider that certain actions by the PLC’s actuators can perturb
these physical processes in undesired and harmful ways. The programs and settings used
in the PLC dictate these actions for the actuator. The prediction flags whether the resulting
impact would be safe or unsafe. This work also examined whether the resulting impact
caused imminent danger. To make the predictions, ARMA models that represent the
physical system and also ladder logic are simulated for a given number of scan cycles
depending on how far into the future it is desired to predict.
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8.1 Contributions and Implications
Through a series of experiments that include multiple engineering domains, the researcher
gained an understanding of the benefits and limitations of these techniques. The results of
this work demonstrate that EPPIPS can accurately detect malicious commands that could
lead a physical process to veer into an unsafe condition over time and also commands that
cause imminent danger. A small limitation of the EPPIPS approach is that a domain expert
must provide the specifications for safety and imminent danger. However, these
specifications are not as cumbersome as other similar approaches found in the literature
since the model created for making the predictions can be generated automatically through
system identification and machine learning methods. The results of this work show that
EPPIPS was able to classify the vast majority of the simulated scenarios correctly. The
very low latency of EPPIPS in making the predictions is also noteworthy. A summary of
the major of contributions in this dissertation are as follows:
1. The author created multiple testbeds and other representative equipment - (1)
Generator System, (2) Single Station Pipeline with Variable Speed Pump, (3)
Storage Tank with Variable Speed Pump (4) Heating, Ventilation and Air
Conditioning System (HVAC) System, and (5) System Instrumented System
(SIS).
2. The author developed EPPIPS, which was designed to protect the PLCs against
malicious commands and settings that perturb the physical system to unsafe
states.
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3. There were limited specifications for safety and imminent danger that a domain
expert was required to add. Only the safety ranges were necessary to provide
since ARMA models were trained from time-series data.
4. EPPIPS was successful in responding to cyber-attacks.
5. Analysis and evaluation demonstrated that EPPIPS had a high accuracy and very
low latency.
The results of this work demonstrated that the EPPIPS was effective when dealing
with cyber-attacks that were designed as valid commands and impacted the physical system
to cause unsafe conditions. The low latency means that EPPIPS did not adversely impact
the cyber-physical system that the PLC regulated. The methods were especially important
for cyber-physical systems since computerized devices that interact with physical systems
can impact the physical world. Predicting this impact was important for defending these
systems.
Conversely, general IT mitigations may be effective to a limited degree in detecting
and responding to attacks on a computer network. The degree that they are effective
depends on their ability to detect suspicious behavior in computer networks, such as
increased traffic, packet size, and interarrival time. However, those methods may fail
because they do not account for the effect of a valid command packet or program that has
physical consequences. Therefore, a command or program may appear as normal to
common IDSs and may have specific behavior from the network that would not flag these
IDSs. General IT mitigation methods such as encryption and authentication may largely be
effective in securing end-to-end communication between nodes on a network, but a node
that has become compromised in the scheme could affect other nodes, such as a PLC. The
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blindness of traditional IDS methods and other mitigation techniques necessitates the IPS
presented in this work, which performs deep packet inspection on valid commands and
ladder logic uploads and can predict these payloads’ impacts.

8.2 Further Research
This dissertation builds on the foundation of Alves [40], who created OpenPLC and
experimented with initial security features that include encryption on the application layer
of the network communication of the PLC and HMI. OpenPLC enables researchers to more
easily experiment with new ideas for ICS cybersecurity, which is in contrast to the
commercial PLCs of many manufacturers. The software of these manufacturers is
proprietary. Therefore, their source code is not available. Furthermore, these manufacturers
require the users to sign End User License Agreements (EULA) that prohibit modification
and reverse engineering. These restrictions may thwart the creative development of new
security features. However, because of the open source nature of OpenPLC software,
OpenPLC could be modified and used for the purposes of this work.
The work of this dissertation, in turn, lends itself to further research to develop
more advanced versions of the methods. The following table summarizes the various future
directions for research topics that build on this dissertation’s foundation. Explanations of
these research topics are also given.
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Table 8.1: Research Directions

Item

Research Topic

1

Advanced version of dynamic analysis of cyber-physical systems with
instrumentation

2

A more advanced sandbox environment for malware testing that includes
malicious updates to the PLC firmware in cyber-physical systems.

3

Testing EPPIPS with different prediction models besides ARMA and
applying other machine learning approaches to the training to compare
latency and accuracy for different methods.

4

EPPIPS compared experimentally with other types of complementary IDSs

5

More extensive attribution and forensics of commands and malicious ladder
logic using logs

6

Adapting EPPIPS to predict other harmful physical consequences due to
commands and programs, such as cost and inefficiency.

First, an advanced version of EPPIPS would involve dynamic analysis of ladder
logic code using instrumentation, which is an approach to malware analysis involving the
addition of trace code in the compiled binary or source code of interest. Experiments
involving instrumentation may be performed to track what parts of the code are executed,
what parts are not, and other useful statistics. For the PLC software, instrumentation may
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be included in the ST code or the raw binary. A more advanced approach to dynamic
malware analysis would allow for a greater understanding of the ladder logic program’s
potential to be malicious and harmful for a given ICS. The work [56] is a recent survey that
defines the major concepts of malware analysis and techniques that can also be applied to
ladder logic code.
Second, the EPPIPS may employ dynamic analysis using QEMU as a testing
platform to represent the embedded system in a sandboxed environment. This platform
facilitates the analysis of firmware updates to observe if they would harm the ICS, which
goes beyond this dissertation's scope.
Third, instead of using ARMA models to make predictions, other approaches may
be considered, including transfer function models, state-space models, and nonlinear
models. The results of using these other models may be compared with the results of this
dissertation, which can serve as a baseline for future work. Latency and accuracy are useful
metrics for comparison in these cases. Other techniques of machine learning may be
employed, such as those involving neural networks. One concern that may need to be
addressed with models other than the ARMA model is that the latency to run these alternate
models may be far greater than that of the ARMA model. Because of this, it may be
necessary to define more criteria for Hypothesis 3 when evaluating real-time requirements.
For example, if the latency of an alternate model exceeds the PLC interval, this may be
acceptable. The new criteria could examine whether a high latency would affect the
physical process adversely.
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Fourth, further research avenues include using the EPPIPS of this dissertation in
conjunction with other IDSs that focus on network traffic behavior. In this case, EPPIPS
would be complementary to other IDSs to cover a broad spectrum of attacks so that if one
IDS is blind to certain attacks, the other IDS is more likely to detect them. There may also
be cases where anomalous behavior on the network correlates with EPPIPS's detection of
malicious payloads that would eventually lead to harm to the cyber-physical system. These
combined symptoms would indicate a higher case of risk than if only one of these
symptoms had occurred.
Fifth, other future work could also be in the attribution of commands arising from
the network to determine the source of the packet. Such attribution goes beyond attributing
predicted harmful behavior to a specific cyber-event, such as a packet's arrival at the PLC.
The reason for using a more advanced attribution would be to distinguish between
accidental harm and malicious harm. A possible source of the commands is a legitimate
user or process who intends to have the ICS running in normal operations. The packet may
also originate from an illegal entity that has access to the network.
Lastly, researchers may add the ability for EPPIPS to predict the cost or inefficiency
of a command or program in addition to whether the physical system will become unsafe.
A command or program dictates to the PLC how to control the actuators in cyber-physical
systems. Actuators perform actions that consume fuel or electricity. If predictions can be
made about how the actuators will behave with a given physical system, then predictions
of the costs associated with their behavior can also be predicted.
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APPENDIX A. LADDER LOGIC DESCRIPTIONS AND DIAGRAMS

Necessary ladder logic was created for testbeds and experimental setup of this work. The
ladder logic is described and visualized in this Appendix and includes the Ladder Logic for
the Storage tank, Pipeline, HVAC, and the Safety Instrumented System (SIS). Some
malicious versions of the ladder logic for Pipeline and HVAC are also included. The
relevant variables of the ladder logic are listed with descriptions. The variables consist of
the registers and coils. In this work the PLCOpen editor was used to create the ladder logic.

A.1 Storage Tank and Pipeline, Both with Variable Speed Pumps
The ladder logic for the storage tank and pipeline, both with variable speed pumps, is the
same. This logic uses a certain set of registers, which are the main variables for input,
output and settings as seen in the following table:
Table A.1 Registers and Coils used for Variable Speed Pump Control logic

Variable Name

Address

Description

act_com

%QW0

Actuator signal to pump

P

%QW1

Proportional gain for PI control

I

%QW2

Integral Gain for PI control
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REF

%QW3

Reference or setpoint for PI control

mode_register

%QW4

Control mode setting

pump_register

%QW5

Pump state for manual mode

Intensity

%QW6

Intensity of variable speed pump for when it is on

Converted
Pressure

%QW7

Value for pressure after converting from raw value

min_sp

%QW8

Minimum set point for hysteresis control

max_sp

%QW9

Maximum set point for hysteresis control

Pump

%QX0.0

pump state

Valve

%QX0.1

valve state

Reset

%QX0.2

Reset

pump_man

%QX0.3

pump state for manual mode

pump_auto

%QX0.4

pump state for automatic mode

Pressure

%IW0

raw pressure from sensor
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The ladder logic developed for the variable speed pump pipeline is depicted in Figure 6.5
and has three main modes: (1) Manual, (2) Hysteresis Control, and (3) PI Control. The
Ladder Logic uses a register to store the current mode. The ladder logic is partitioned into
several sections. The first section is for converting the raw pressure reading to a value more
useful to the ladder logic. The second section implements the manual mode. If the register
designated as “pump_register” is equal to one, then the “pump_manual” is set “High.”
Otherwise, “pump_manual” is set low. The third section is for the hysteresis control, the
theory of which is explained in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. This section consists of two
main rungs. The top rung checks to see if the converted pressure is less than the low set
point using a Less-than-Equal (LE) block. If such is the case the coil “pump_auto” is set
“High.” The bottom rung, on the other hand, uses a Greater-than-Equal (GE) block to
determine if the converted pressure is above the high set point, in which case “pump_auto”
is reset to “Low.” The fourth section is for determining the “pump” value depending on
whether the mode is set to 1 or 2. If the mode = 1 then, then the value “pump_man” is
allowed to pass as the value for “pump.” On the other hand, if the mode value = 2, then the
value “pump_auto” is passed to the value for “pump”. The purpose of the fourth section is
to choose whether the manual control or the hysteresis control dictate the value of the
“pump” coil. The fifth section is dedicated to the PI controller and for managing the final

190

output for the actuator. The value for “pump” is fed into a SEL switch to select whether to
pass a 0 or the register Intensity for when the pump is “High”. The PI controller is
implemented using an ST block. Note that there are several registers for the proportional
and integral gains that may be changed to tune the PID and PI controller. The fifth section
also contains a main multiplexor select switch that allows for the output of the PI controller
or the analog output of the “pump” value.
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Figure A.1: Ladder Logic for Variable Speed Pump (Top Portion)

192

Figure A.2: Ladder Logic for Variable Speed Pump (Bottom Portion)
There are also a version of the ladder logic with a time bomb and another version with a
logic bomb. Figure A.3 Depicts the bottom portion of the ladder logic for the time bomb.
The time bomb has a portion of ladder logic to generate a clock signal or square wave.
Once 200 pulses of the square occur a multiplexer (SEL block at bottom) is set to output a
different input than the usual - one that turns on the pump at full speed. Figure A.4 Depicts
the bottom portion of the ladder logic for the logic bomb. For the logic bomb, the pump is
turned on with the maximum setting if the control mode is set to 3, which is normal for PI
mode. The value of 3 for the control mode is the triggering condition for the logic bomb.
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Figure A.3: Ladder Logic for Variable Speed Pump (Time Bomb - Bottom Portion)
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Figure A.4: Ladder Logic for Variable Speed Pump (Logic Bomb - Bottom Portion)
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A.2 HVAC

The ladder logic for Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) has several modes
and a large number of registers, which can be seen in Table A.2
Table A.2 Registers and Coils used for Variable Speed Pump Control logic

Variable Name

Address

Description

temp

%IW0

Temperature Sensor

temp_filtered

%QW8

Temperature Data Processed

Alarm

%QX0.5

Alarm

min_sp

%QW1

Minimum setpoint

max_sp

%QW2

Maximum setpoint

mode_register

%QW3

Mode Register

heat_register

%QW4

Heat Control for Manual Mode

cool_register

%Q5

Cool Control for Manual Mode
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heat

%QX0.0

State of Heating System

cool

%QX0.1

State of Cooling System

heat_man

%QX99.0

Multiplexed State for the Heating System in Manual
Mode

heat_auto

%QX99.1

Multiplexed State for the Heating System in
Automatic Mode

cool_man

%QX99.2

Multiplexed State for the Cooling System in Manual
Mode

cool_auto

%QX99.3

Multiplexed State for the Cooling System in
Automatic Mode

An explanation of the ladder logic of the HVAC system in Figures A.5-6 is as follows: To
aid in this discussion of the ladder logic for this testbed, the ladder logic is divided into
several sections as indicated by the comments within the ladder logic. These sections are
(1) Off Mode, (2) Manual Mode, (3) Auto Mode - Heat, (4) Auto Mode - Cool, (5) Output.
For ease of viewing, the ladder logic is partitioned into two images for top and bottom
portions of the ladder logic.
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Figure A.5: Ladder Logic for HVAC (Top Portion)
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Figure A.6: Ladder Logic for HVAC (Bottom Portion)
For Section One, which corresponds to “off mode”, when the register mode is set
to 0, the output of the “EQ” block in the rung of that section is set to one or “High” The
“EQ” works by comparing both of its inputs to determine if they are equal. If they are, the
output is “High.” Otherwise, the output of the “EQ” block is set to “Low.” A “high” value
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for output of the “EQ” block causes the “heat” and “cool” coils to be reset meaning both
coils are set low. These specific coils are associated with the states of the actuators for the
heating and cooling systems.
For Section Two (Manual Mode), there are two rungs. For the first rung, when the
heat register is set to 1, the output of the “EQ” block in the rungs becomes “High”. Thus
the coil (“Heat_man”) is set high. Likewise, when the cool register is set to 1, the coil
(“Cool_man”) is set high. These coils serve as flags for the output section of ladder logic.
The two registers (heat and cool registers) are considered settings that may be set by the
user at an HMI that can send command packets to the PLC to set these registers.
For Section Three (Auto Mode - Heat), two rungs are used to implement hysteresis
control. If the temperature as indicated by the temp register is equal to or greater than the
high set point, then the “heat_auto” coil is reset to “low” or false. The “GE” block is used
to make this comparison. If, on the other hand, the temp register is equal to or less than the
low set point, then the “head_auto” coil is set to “high” or True. The “LE” block is used to
achieve this.
For Section Four (Auto Mode - Cool), two rungs are used to implement hysteresis
control like the previous section, but the set and reset operation is performed in reverse for
the “cool_auto” coil. Because using this mode assumes that the outside temperature is
higher than the inside temperature, there is a tendency for the inside to become warmer
until an equilibrium is reached. Therefore, the PLC must maintain the desired temperature
by cooling the building.
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The remaining Section Five of the ladder logic is the portion that deals with the
output. The logic of this section is such that the following operations are performed: If the
mode register is equal to 2 (“Auto Mode – Heat”) and the “heat_auto” flag which is
determined by section 3 is set “high”, then “heat” coil becomes set “High”. If the mode
register is equal to 3 (“Auto Mode – Cool”) and the “cool_auto” flag which is determined
by section 3 is set “high”, then the “heat” coil becomes set “High”. When the mode register
is set to 1 for manual mode, the flags “heat_man” and “cool_man” determine the states of
the “heat” and “coils.”
Note that there is also a version of the HVAC ladder logic with malicious behavior
to increase the cost of using the HVAC. The ladder logic is seen in Figures A.7-8:
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Figure A.7: Ladder Logic for HVAC (Top Portion)
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Figure A.8: Ladder Logic for HVAC (Bottom Portion)
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A.3 Generator
The Generator system has complex ladder logic design, but this work focuses on a specific
portion of the logic. For the benefit of the reader the entire ladder logic presented. The
description is adapted from a work by the author. The following are the set of variables
relevant to the ladder logic:
Table A.3 Registers and Coils used for Variable Speed Pump Control logic

Variable Name

Address

Description

act_com

%QW0

Fuel Injection

Gain

%QW2

Gain used in engine governor control system

Reference

%QW4

Desired Reference Frequency

vrms_max

%QW5

Maximum Voltage

irms_max

%QW6

Maximum Current

oil_min

%QW7

Minimum Oil Pressure

Temp_min

%QW8

Minimum Engine Temperature

Temp_max

%QW9

Maximum Engine Temperature
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rpm_max

%QW10

Maximum RPM

Vrms

%IW0

Voltage RMS

Irms

%IW1

Current IRMS

Frequency

%IW2

Frequency

RPM

%IW3

Revolutions Per Minute of Engine Shaft

Fuel

%IW4

Fuel level as a Percentage

Oil

%IW5

Oil Pressure

Temp

%IW6

Engine Temperature

Omega

%IW7

Angular Velocity of Engine Shaft

Switch

%QX0.0

Boolean value for which Reference to use

Onoff

%QX0.1

On/Off

Override

%QX0.2

Override to Prevent
Shutdown

Fault

%QX0.3

Fault
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Fault from

Triggering

Reset

%QX0.4

Reset Fault

Fault2

%QX0.5

Fault2

Figure 2 depicts the portion of the main ladder logic of the DCS, which controls the engine
governor and checks the validity of sensor data. The sensor readings are passed through
comparator blocks within the ladder logic; if these values leave a valid range, the DCS
triggers a fault because there is a potential for the system to be physically damaged.
Because safe operating ranges vary from system to system, these valid ranges are stored
within the DCS as editable registers to allow operators to set the variables as needed. What
follows is an explanation of each of the rungs in the ladder logic beginning at the top and
proceeding to the bottom.
The purpose of the first and second rungs are for detecting if the voltage or current
exceeds a maximum voltage and current, respectively. In such events, the generator triggers
a fault. The third rung of the ladder logic shown uses both a less than block (LT) to compare
the oil pressure (Oil) to the minimum (oil_min) and a greater than block (GT) to compare
the pressure to the maximum pressure (oil_max). If either block’s output is “true”, the
physical model’s oil pressure is outside the safe operating range and a fault is triggered by
setting (S) the boolean fault variable to a value of “True.” The fourth rung down uses a
greater than block to verify that the current engine temperature (Temp) has not risen above
the maximum temperature (temp_max). If the temperature is too high, a fault is triggered.
In the fifth rung of logic, the RPM is compared to the fastest allowable engine speed
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(RPM_max) via a greater than block. The fifth rung checks the Fault and Override variables
to determine the generator’s state (onoff). If no fault has been triggered (Fault = false) and
the fault override has not been set (Override = False), the generator will remain on. If a
fault is triggered and the override is not set, however, the generator will cut off. On other
hand, the generator will remain on if the override is set despite any faults that occur. The
last rung’s purpose is for the fault to be reset when desired by the user if a fault has
occurred. Below these rungs is a selector block, which allows one of two given values for
the reference to pass as the value for reference depending on the user’s selection (boolean
variable “switch”) of the set point for frequency (60Hz. or 50Hz.).
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Figure A.9: Ladder Logic for Generator
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In addition, included in the ladder logic is a block that serves as the controller, written in
ST (Structured Text) code. This code is a high-level programming language as part of the
IEC-61131-3 standard. An algorithm was created in this controller that implements the
digital controller for regulating the speed of the engine. As seen at the bottom of Figure 2,
the controller is implemented as a block in the ladder logic. This block takes the angular
velocity (omega in the ladder logic) of the engine and the reference angular velocity as
input. The controller then determines, based upon the transfer function, whether to
increase, decrease, or maintain the speed at which fuel is injected into the engine. This
value is output as the variable act_com in Figure 2.9, This bottom subsystem (as seen in
Figure 2) of the DCS uses a function block to implement a governor to regulate the speed
of the engine shaft by controlling the fuel injection rate. This block in functionally
equivalent to the dashed box in the following image (Figure A.10):

Figure A.10: Block diagram of implementation of transfer function in Equation 1

Wref (a variable that corresponds with “Reference” in the ladder logic) represents the
reference, or desired, angular velocity of the engine shaft, while W (A variable that
corresponds with Omega in the ladder logic) represents the current angular velocity. W is
read by a sensor and passed through a zero-order hold, which is needed to convert the
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resulting value from a continuous-time value to a discrete one. Within the portion of the
governor implemented in the DCS, the current velocity, which is given from sampled
sensor readings, is subtracted from the reference velocity to determine the error, or the
difference between the ideal and actual values. The resulting value is then passed through
a discrete transfer function as represented as a block within the dashed area of Figure 3.
This transfer function uses Equation 1:

(1)
The output of that function is multiplied by the gain, an adjustable parameter stored in a
register within the DCS. The output of the gain is transmitted to the physical model and
passed through the actuator block to produce the torque value, which is multiplied by W,
the angular velocity. The product of this multiplication is Pm, the mechanical power, which
is used by the Simulink model to determine the electrical output of the engine. The work
[57] describes a continuous-time transfer function for this governor, which this work
discretized so that the transfer function can be implemented on the DCS. Because the DCS
is a digital system, it is important to note that the DCS has a sampling period. Essentially,
an input to the system is sampled at a period determined appropriate by the designer of the
system. Updates to internal state variables and outputs, which may be partially determined
by the inputs, are performed at the sampling period. If a higher sampling rate is selected,
then the more accurate the digital transfer function will behave like its continuous-time
counterpart. Parameters of the transfer function were determined for a digital system with
a sampling period of 20ms. Special methods can be applied to convert a continuous transfer

210

function to a discrete transfer function at a given sampling period. MATLAB provides
commands that can carry out this operation [59].

A.4 Safety Instrumented System
For the ladder logic of the Safety Instrumented System (SIS), a simple design was created.
The diagram in Figure A.5 depicts the ladder logic for SIS. The reason for the simplicity
in design is that plant personnel desire to have the design to be easy to understand and
reduce the likelihood of an error in the ladder logic. In doing so, there is a high probability
that the SIS would be effective at handling situations where the process variable is about
to become unsafe. The operation of the ladder logic is as follows: If the process variable
(ProcessVar in Fig A.11) is greater than a certain value (TriggerState) that is generally
slightly less than the unsafe condition, then a master switch turning of the actuator is set,
and a valve is released. These actions are done in order to ensure the safety of the physical
system.
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Figure A.11: Ladder Logic for SIS
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APPENDIX B. METHODS FOR PARAMETER ESTIMATION AND
TUNING

This dissertation uses the method of least square error to calculate the parameters of the
ARMA models. The method involves solving the normal equation for the parameters
vector:

In Eq. B.1, J is the regressor matrix; y is the output and is vector of the sampled output;
and theta is the parameters vector that contains the a and b parameters of the ARMA model.
The solution is therefore is the following:
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